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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of terrorism by non-state actors did not, of course,
begin with the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
Equally, the extraterritorial actions taken by the United States and other
States since then-from the invasion and occupation of Iraq to European
proposals to detain asylum seekers outside the European Union-are in
their nature not new. That said, just as the attacks have resulted in a
global public policy focus on the threat posed by terrorists, so the wide
range and scope of the extraterritorial state actions taken or proposed
since the 2001 attacks has led to greater critical attention being focused
on what States do outside their territory.
Extraterritorial state activities raise a number of important political
and legal questions including, fundamentally, whether they are justified,
both in terms of the activity itself and the manner in which it is con-
ducted. One aspect of the latter justification concerns whether such
actions conform to human rights standards, and this in turn raises its own
question as to whether, and to what extent, human rights law applies to
extraterritorial state actions, thereby potentially offering a normative
framework by which conformity to human rights standards can be
judged. A striking feature, however, of some of the commentary on cer-
tain post-9/11 extraterritorial activities-notably the U.S. detention of
several hundred individuals at its Naval Base in Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba-is the suggestion that these activities take place in a "legal black
hole."
This Article considers the significant role that extraterritorial activity
is playing in the post-9/11 foreign policy of some States and the idea that
this activity somehow takes place "outside" the law or, at least, outside
an arena where legal norms apply as a matter of course rather than only
when and to the extent that the State involved decides these norms will
apply.' It begins in Section II by mapping out the extraterritorial state
activities conducted since 9/11, covering activities with a personalized
object-such as the military action taken in Afghanistan against Al
Qaeda-and activities with a spatial (territorial) object-such as the oc-
cupation of Iraq. Greater information is given on extraterritorial
activities involving the detention of terrorist suspects, asylum seekers,
1. Amnesty International states that "the detainees held in Guantdnamo, Bagram and
elsewhere are at the mercy of... the executive's interpretation of what protections the Consti-
tution demands and the USA's international obligations require."
Amnesty International, United States of America: The Threat of a Bad Example: Under-
mining International Standards as "War on Terror" Detentions Continue, AI Doc. No.
AMR 51/114/2003 12 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/
ENGAMR511142003 [hereinafter Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2003].
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and others as such activities (with the exception of the detentions in
Guantdinamo Bay and Iraq) have not been given much attention when
compared to, say, the high-profile military campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The subject matter of this study having been set out, Section III then
considers the relevance of human rights ideas to this subject matter. Sali-
ent features of the activity in this regard are identified, including the
extraterritorial locus and the relative lack of third-party scrutiny. In the
context of terrorist suspects detained extraterritorially, a key feature of
post-9/11 discourse is highlighted: the idea that the terrorist threat means
that methods of interrogation involving torture and/or inhuman and de-
grading treatment might be in order; and the allegation that such
methods are in fact being practiced in some cases. These and other spe-
cial features of post-9/1 1 extraterritorial activities are invoked to support
a thesis that greater scrutiny is needed of the impact on individuals of
States' activities beyond their borders.
Section IV considers the proposition that one means through which
human rights scrutiny might operate-the application of human rights
law-is lacking because of the "legal black hole" that prevails in the ex-
traterritorial locus. Moreover, we see that some observers allege that in
certain cases the reason for carrying out some initiatives extraterritori-
ally is this supposed relative lack of legal regulation as it enables States
to take action-specifically, prolonged detention and/or the conduct of
interrogations that involve torture and/or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment-that would not be lawful were it to be conducted in the State's
own territory.
Section V then considers whether a key international law aspect of
the "legal black hole" thesis holds water: are the main international trea-
ties on civil and political rights inapplicable to these activities by reason
of the "wartime" context in which some of them occur and/or the extra-
territorial location in which they are conducted? We see that despite the
suggestions made by some critics of the States engaged in the extraterri-
torial activities discussed, and by the States themselves, this area of law
continues to apply in the extraterritorial context.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE ACTIVITIES
As far as their purposes are concerned, extraterritorial state activities
can be categorized according to the object they are aimed at. On the one
hand, they can be aimed at a personalized object: particular groups or
individuals, for example activities taken to capture members of a terrorist
organization. On the other hand, they can be aimed at a spatial object: a
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particular territorial unit, for example territorial occupation conducted
for general strategic purposes. Activities can affect one object when con-
trol is exercised over the other object. Focusing on what the activities are
aimed at, however, is helpful in highlighting the purpose or purposes
with which they are associated.
Beginning with extraterritorial activities with a personalized object,
such activities are aimed at the government of the territory in which the
action takes place and/or non-state groups and individuals (e.g. terror-
ists) in that territory. Activities within this category can be divided into
two groups. The first covers diplomatic and consular activity; the State
representing itself to those in the foreign territory, including its govern-
ment and the State's own nationals, for example through operating
embassy premises. The second group covers activities involving some
kind of coercive action against governments or non-state actors. This
includes what is usually termed the "use of force" in the lexicon of in-
ternational law: military action conducted in foreign territory targeting
governments or non-state actors in that territory. Examples would be the
military action- conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom
in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, explained in terms of neutralizing Al
Qaeda following the attacks on the United States on 9/11,2 and the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003, explained in terms of enforcing Iraq's disarmament
obligations.3 It also includes coercive action on a lesser scale, such as the
2. On the legal justification offered, see Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Charg6
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/947 (2001) and Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/terrorismletters.htm.
For academic commentary, see, for example, Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and
International Law After 11 September, 51 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 401 (2002); Antonio Cassese,
Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 993 (2001); Tom J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condomin-
ium?, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (2002); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-
emptive Use of Force; Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 7 (2003);
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the War Against Terrorism, 78 INT'L AFFAIRS
301 (2002); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: the Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537 (1999) [hereinafter Lobel 1999]; Sean D.
Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43
HARV. INT'L L. J. 41 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and
Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (2002); Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello
After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905 (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terror-
ism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559 (1999).
3. On the legal justification offered, see Letter Dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (2003) [hereinafter UK-US Letter, May 8, 2003]. For academic com-
mentary, see for example, the articles in 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 481-991 (2003); Michael Bothe,
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alleged abduction of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish agents
in Kenya in 1999.
4
Extraterritorial activity with a spatial object is aimed at exercising
control with respect to the territory in order that particular policy objec-
tives can be promoted. States, either individually or collectively, assert
plenary or partial administrative control over other States, such as the
Coalition Provisional Administration (CPA) in Iraq between 2003-
2004,' or parts of other States, such as the U.S. base in Guantd.namo Bay
in Cuba, or non-state territories, such as the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The existence of what might be termed
"foreign territorial administration" (administration by a State over terri-
tory in respect of which it does not enjoy title) can be explained in four
ways.
The first explanation for foreign territorial administration relates to
what might be called "colonial" arrangements: the State exercises ad-
ministration as a consequence of an earlier decision to depart from the
usual practice of decolonization, for example where the local population
chooses to retain a relationship with the domestic government without
being assimilated formally into the sovereign territory of that State. An
example would be what are now called British Overseas Territories, 6
such as the U.K. Falkland Islands.
Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227 (2003); Christine
Gray, From Unity to Polarisation: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Dino Kritsiotis, Arguments of Mass Confusion, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L.
233 (2004); Lobel, supra note 2; Vaughan Lowe, The Iraq Crisis: What Now?, 52 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 859 (2003); Sean D. Murphy, Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 419 (2003); Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 209 (2003); Colin Warbrick, Current Developments-Public International Law. The Use of
Force against Iraq, 52 INT'L & Coup. L.Q. 811 (2003).
4. See Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Judgment on the Merits,
Mar. 12, 2003), at http://www.echr.coe.int [hereinafter Ocalan (Merits)].
5. See UK-US Letter, May 8, 2003, supra note 3; S.C. Res. 1483 (2003); S.C. Res.
1511 (2003); S.C. Res. 1546 (2003).
6. On British Overseas Territories, see British Overseas Territories Act, 2002, c. 8
(Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020008.htm and U.K. Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Territories, at http://www.fco.gov.uk. The U.K. position
on its continuing relationship to the BOTs is summarized as follows: "Self-determination does
not necessarily mean independence. Britain has willingly granted independence where it has
been requested, and will continue to do so where it is an option, while remaining committed to
those of its Overseas Territories which choose to retain the British connection."
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles-Falkland Islands, at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&
cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1018965238550 [hereinafter UK FCO Falk-
lands webpage].
7. On the Falkland Islands, see the U.K. FCO Falklands webpage, supra note 6 and
the Falklands Government webpage, at http://www.fallands.gov.fk [hereinafter Falklands
Government website].
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The second category of foreign territorial administration covers the
permanent or semi-permanent state administration of foreign territory for
long-term military or strategic purposes, such as the U.S. Naval Support
Facility on the Pacific island of Diego Garcfa, which forms part of the
British Indian Ocean Territory, a U.K. dependent territory.8 The U.S. fa-
cility in Guantdnamo Bay also falls into this category. In two 1903
agreements, Cuba leased two areas in its territory-in Bahia Honda in
the northwest and Guantdnamo Bay in the southeast-to the United
States "for the time required for the purpose of coaling and naval sta-
tions."9 Whereas Cuba continued to enjoy "ultimate sovereignty" over
the two areas (i.e. title),'0 the United States would exercise "complete
jurisdiction and control" within them (i.e. the right of territorial admini-
stration), including the "right to acquire ... any land or other property
therein."" In a 1934 treaty, the two States agreed that the stipulations in
the 1903 agreements regarding the naval station in Guantdnamo Bay
would continue in effect until they agreed to modify or abrogate them.'2
Because no such agreement has yet been reached, the United States con-
tinues to exercise plenary administrative competences in "Naval Base
Guantdnamo Bay."'
3
The third explanation for foreign territorial administration is based
on military action conducted in the territory. Here, administration can be
explained as a consequence of such action-as in Iraq-and/or in imme-
8. On the status of Diego Garcfa, see Mike O'Brien, Written Answer: British Indian
Ocean Territory, HOUSE OF COMMONS HANSARD, Vol. 399, Part No. 348, Column 935W (Feb.
13, 2003), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/
vo0302l3/text/30213w22.htm#30213w22.htmlspnewlI [hereinafter O'Brien, Feb. 13,
2003]; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles- British Indian Ocean Territory
(2004), at http://www.fco.gov.uk; Island History, at http://www.dg.navy.mil. On the U.S.
Support Facility, see, for example, Agreement between the United States and the United
Kingdom on Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes, Dec. 30,
1966, U.S.-U.K., 18 U.S.T. 28, 603 U.N.T.S. 273; O'Brien, Feb. 13, 2003, supra note 8;
Island History, supra note 8.
9. Agreement Between for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coal-
ing and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. I. U.S.T. 418. available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/cuba/cuba002.htm [hereinafter US-Cuba
Agreement #1 1903]. Agreement on the Lease of Certain Areas for Naval or Coaling Stations,
July 2, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, U.S.T. 426, available at http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalon/
diplomacy/cuba/cuba003.htm, covers further aspects of the lease, including remuneration by
the United States to Cuba.
10. US-Cuba Agreement #1 1903, supra note 9, art. I.
11. Id. art. III. See also id. art. It (on the use and occupation of the adjacent waters).
12. Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba,
art. II, T.S. No. 866, available at http://www.yale.edullawweblavalon/diplomacy/cubal
cuba00l .htm.
13. See the website of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantdnamo, at http://www.nsgtmo.
navy.mil. On the legal status of Guantdnamo Bay, see also the discussion in the Supreme
Court decision in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91, 2696 (2004).
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diate defensive (as opposed to long-term strategic) terms, or as part of a
peace settlement following the end of armed hostilities-as with the
military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (by the NATO-led SFOR
[formerly IFOR] and then the EU force EUFOR)'4 and Kosovo (by
KFOR)."5
The fourth type of foreign territorial administration is distinctive for
being aimed at furthering asylum policy. Certain foreign state represen-
tatives now operate in the airports of other States-U.K. immigration
officials at Prague Airport, for example. Acting in conjunction with air-
port and airline officers, these representatives attempt to prevent
individuals suspected of intending to make an unfounded asylum claim
from traveling to their country.
6
In addition to these partial asylum policy-related administrative ac-
tivities, certain States set up camps located outside their territories to
house individuals claiming asylum in their countries. This strategy was
14. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 89, at 91 (Annex IA, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement), 101 (Appen-
dix A to Annex IA, with maps), 102 (Appendix B to Annex IA, Agreement Between the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel), 104 (Appendix B to Annex 1A, Agreement
Between the Republic of Croatia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Con-
cerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel), 106 (Appendix B to Annex IA, Agreement
Between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) Concerning Transit Arrangements for Peace Plan Operations), 111 (Annex 2, Inter-
Entity Boundary, and appendix thereto). See also S.C. Res. 1491, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1491
(2003); S.C. Res. 1423, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1423 (2002); S.C. Res. 1421, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1421 (2002); S.C. Res. 1420, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1420 (2002); S.C. Res. 1418, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1418 (2002); S.C. Res.1357, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1357 (2001); S.C. Res. 1305,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1305 (2000); S.C. Res. 1247, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1247 (1999); S.C. Res.
1174, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I174 (1998); S.C. Res. 1144, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 144 (1997); S.C.
Res. 1103, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I103 (1997); S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (1996);
S.C. Res. 1035, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995); S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031
(1995); and the NATO, IFOR, and SFOR websites, at http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm and
http://www.nato.int/sfor. Under S.C. Res. 1575, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1575 (2004), EU Member
States acting through or in cooperation with the EU were authorized to establish a multina-
tional stabilisation force (EUFOR) as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and
control. See also EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at http://www.
euforbih.org.
15. See Agreement on the Principles (Peace Plan) to Move Towards a Resolution of the
Kosovo Crisis, U.N. Doc. S/1999/649 (1999) (presented to the leadership of the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European
Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Fed-
eration, contained in Letter dated June 7, 1999 from the Permanent Representative of
Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council). See also
S.C. Res. 1367, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1367 (2001); S.C. Res. 1345, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1345
(2001); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999); and the KFOR website, at
http://www.nato.int/kfor.
16. On U.K. immigration officials at Prague Airport, see R v. Immigration Officer at
Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma Rights Centre and others
(Appellants), Dec. 9, 2001, 2 W.L.R. 1 (H.L. 2005).
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pioneered by Australia with its facilities in the island of Nauru. Within
the European Union, States have considered creating "Transit Processing
Centers" (TPCs) to which asylum-seekers in EU Member States would
be transferred pending the determination of their asylum claims. Cer-
tain U.K. proposals in this regard would locate the centers outside the
European Union itself, possibly in Croatia, Romania, or Albania, al-
though the resistance to this on the part of other EU Member States led
initially to suggestions that such centers may be set up in some of the
more recent members of the EU, such as Poland.18 The current U.K. po-
sition is to focus on initiatives involving "third countries in the region of
origin19 although it is uncertain whether such initiatives would involve
the European Union or its Member States becoming directly involved in
administrative activities.
In drawing up these classifications, particular features of the admin-
istrative setup are emphasized in order to identify the purpose for which
territorial control is exercised as far as the administering State is con-
cerned. Of course, many of these features exist in more than one type of
project even if they are only significant for one. For example, territories
in the second category (defensive) may have been created in the same
17. See Letter from Tony Blair, U.K. Prime Minister to Costas Simitis, Greek Prime
Minister (Mar. 10, 2003), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/blair-simitis-
asile.pdf [hereinafter Blair letter, Mar. 10, 2003]; Gregor Noll, Visions of the Exceptional:
Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones, 5
EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 303 (2003); The Albanian Solution, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2003, at
33; Martin Bright et al., Secret Balkan Camp Built to Hold UK Asylum Seekers, OBSERVER,
June 15, 2003, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,977842,
00.html; Rory Watson, British Plan for Asylum Havens Rebuffed by European Union, LONDON
TIMES, June 20 2003, at 18 [hereinafter Watson]; Amnesty International, UKIEUIUNHCR:
Unlawful and Unworkable: Amnesty International's Views on Proposals for Extra-territorial
Processing of Asylum Claims, Al Doc. IOR 61/004/2003 (June 18, 2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior610042003 [hereinafter Amnesty International
June 2003]; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Statement on the European Council
Meeting, 21 and 22 March 2003, AD2/03/2003/ext/AS (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.ecre.org/statements/Council%20March%202003.shtml [hereinafter ECRE State-
ment].
18. See Blair letter, Mar. 10, 2003, supra note 17; Watson, supra note 17; Amnesty
International June 2003, supra note 17; ECRE Statement, supra note 17. Caroline Flint, the
U.K. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, stated on April 21,
2004 that, following the negative reaction that was received in relation to its proposals for
transit processing centers, the U.K. Government has "done no further work on transit process-
ing, which is no longer on our agenda." European Standing Committee B Debates: Asylum
Systems, House of Commons, Session 2003-04, Column No. 003 (2004), available
at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/eurob/st00402 1/
40421s0l.htm [hereinafter Flint]. The proposals are covered in this Article because they might
be picked up again in the future.
19. Flint, supra note 18, at Column No. 004. See also Alan Travis, Shifting a Problem




circumstances, and have a similar legal basis, as those in the first cate-
gory (colonial). Here, the U.S. administration in Guantdnamo Bay might
be contrasted with the U.K. administration of the Falkland Islands. In
both cases, the reason why the foreign State is able to exercise adminis-
trative control is rooted in a long-standing "colonial" arrangement
(treaties with Cuba and colonial occupation respectively); 20 the official
reason why the administering States concerned wish it to continue, by
contrast, is different; strategic and military purposes in the case of
Guantdnamo Bay, enabling self-determination for the local population in
the case of the Falklands . In understanding how the States concerned
explain reasons for their continued presence in each territory then, the
two arrangements are placed in different categories. If one were engaged
in analyzing different issues, for example establishing territorial status or
self-determination entitlements, then different groupings, operating in a
cross-cutting manner as far as our present grouping are concerned,
would be in order.
Within the general category of foreign territorial administration, a
particular activity is notable: the exercise of administrative powers over
territory in order to operate detention facilities. Dana Priest and Barton
Gellman point out that "[i]n the multifaceted global war on terrorism...
one of the most opaque-yet vital-fronts is the detention and interroga-
tion of terrorism suspects."22
As part of this front, the United States, it is alleged, operates a num-
ber of "secret detention centers overseas. ' 23 Such facilities are designed
20. On Guantnamo, see sources cited supra note 9. On the Falklands, see the U.K.
FCO Falklands webpage, supra note 6. The U.K. position is summarized as follows: "The
British Government has no doubt about Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. With
the exception of the two months of illegal occupation in 1982, the Falklands have been con-
tinuously, peacefully and effectively inhabited and administered by Britain since 1833."
Id at 3.
21. The U.K. position is as follows:
The people who live in the Falklands now are not a transitory population. Many can
trace their origins in the Islands back to the early nineteenth century. Britain is
committed to defend their right to choose their own future. The Islanders are fully
entitled to enjoy the right of self-determination. It is a right which cannot be applied
selectively or be open to negotiation ... In exercise of their right of self-
determination, the Falkland Islanders have repeatedly made known their wish to
remain British.
UK FCO Falklands webpage, supra note 6, at 3. See also The Falkland Islands are a United
Kingdom Overseas Territory by Choice, in FALKLAND ISLANDS-SECURING A FUTURE, IN
FALKLAND ISLANDS BRIEFING, Faldands government website, supra note 7.
22. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, "Stress and Duress" Tactics Used on Terrorism
Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
23. Id. See also Don Van Natta Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal
World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003.
Spring 20051
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to house individuals suspected of being soldiers of foreign States or
members of terrorist organizations, in order to prevent such individuals
from committing future terrorist acts (so-called "security detentions") or
to obtain information from them on military operations or as a prelude to
some kind of criminal prosecution. In the case of some of women de-
tainees in Iraq, it is also alleged that detention is taking place:
not because of anything they have done, but merely because of
who they are married to, and their potential intelligence value.
U.S. officials have previously acknowledged detaining Iraqi
women in the hope of convincing male relatives to provide in-
formation; when U.S. soldiers raid a house and fail to find a
male suspect, they will frequently take away his wife or daugh-
ter instead.2
Suspects are sometimes detained where they were apprehended, as in
Iraq. Priest and Gellman allege that the CIA operates a "secret detention
center" in a "cluster of metal shipping containers" in the "forbidden zone
at the US-occupied Bagram air base in Afghanistan" for "captured al
Qaeda operatives and Taliban commanders."25 From Van Natta Jr.'s report
in the New York Times, it would seem that there is a two-story detention
center for lower-level suspects and then a further secret CIA center for
high-level suspects. z6
One key aspect of the U.S. approach to the detention of terrorist sus-
pects is to perform a further extraterritorial move, transferring U.S.
nationals to the United States, and non-U.S. nationals to military bases
or other CIA-operated detention facilities outside the United States. In
this second category we have the detention facilities in Guantinamo
Bay.27 The numbers of detainees held in that facility have fluctuated; ac-
cording to the U.S. Defense Department as of April 2004 it housed
"approximately 595 detainees," 146 others having been released.28 Priest
and Gellman and Van Natta Jr. allege that detainees have also been trans-
24. Luke Harding, The Other Prisoners, GUARDIAN, May 20, 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0%2C3604%2C1220509%2C00.html.
25. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22. See also Van Natta Jr., supra note 23; Amnesty
International, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 1, 13-14.
26. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
27. For some information about these facilities, see, for example, Global Security
Guantandmo Website at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/Guantdnamo-bay x-
ray.htm.
28. Press Release No. 250-04, U.S. Department of Defense, Detainee Transfer Com-




ferred to the U.S. Navy Support Facility on the island of Diego Garcfa,29
although the U.K. has denied this.3"
Professor Ruth Wedgwood, who sits on the U.S. Defense Policy Ad-
visory Committee Board, explains the choice of the extraterritorial locus
for the detention of terrorist suspects on the grounds that the alternative
of detaining terrorist suspects within the State's own territory might cre-
ate an increased risk of terrorist activity in that territory: "holding large
numbers of Taliban and Qaeda members in the continental United States,
or in the middle of London, poses a major 'NIMBY' problem-'not in
my back yard.' Few localities would volunteer to be the center of Al
Qaeda's possible future attentions."'"
Scott Higham, Joe Stephens, and Margot Williams similarly report
that one of the reasons behind the choice of Guantdnamo was that it was
deemed relatively "safe from attack" and "could be easily defended. 32
This was not only valuable on its own terms; it was also deemed useful
as far as the interrogations that were to take place there. The Washington
Post journalists state that according to Mark R. Jacobson, a former Pen-
tagon official who helped devise the detention operation, "[t]he remote
location and the unlikelihood of escape or rescue could also put psycho-
logical pressure on the captives, adding to their 'desperation' and
compelling them to talk."33
29. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22; Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
30. In a House of Lords debate on January 8, 2003, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Baroness Amos stated that "[t]he United States
Government would need to ask our permission to bring suspects to Diego Garcia and they
have not done so. No suspected terrorists are being held on Diego Garcfa..."
Debate: Diego Garcia, HousE OF LORDS HANSARD, Vol. 642, Part No. 24, Column No.
1020 (2003)(statement of Baroness Amos), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo030108/index/30108-x.htm#contents. Later in the debate, Baron-
ess Amos stated, "I am not aware of any prisoners being held on Diego Garcfa." Id. at Column
No. 1021. Later that year, Menzies Campbell MP asked the U.K. Foreign Secretary "whether
prisoners have been held in (a) US vessels and (b) US merchant vessels chartered by the US
Government moored in Diego Garcia waters; what jurisdiction such prisoners would fall
under; and if he will make a statement."
The Foreign Secretary replied "[t]he United States Government have explicitly assured
us that there have never been any prisoners in detention on any US vessels moored in Diego
Garcfa waters. The British Government are satisfied that this is correct."
Jack Straw, Written Answer: Diego Garcia, HOUSE OF COMMONS HANSARD, Vol. 410,
Part No. 435, Column No. 440W (2003), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo03091 1/text/30911 wlO.htm#30911 w I0.html.
31. Ruth Wedgwood, Let Military Rules Apply While the War Goes On, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 2, 2003, at 8. It would seem, however, that this consideration has not prevented the
transfer of U.S. national suspects back to U.S. soil.
32. Scott Higham et al., Guantdnamo: A Holding Cell in War on Terror, WASH. POST,
May 2, 2004, at Al.
33. Id.
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In the refugee context, some of the official reasons for the extraterri-
torial initiatives conducted or proposed are also rooted in similar
considerations about terrorist threats. In justifying the forced transfer of
asylum seekers bound for Australia to Nauru, Peter Reith, the then Aus-
tralian Defense Minister, argued in 2001 that:
[T]he New York act of terrorism just means that things are not
going to be the same in the future as they've been in the past.
And one of the things that we will need to be looking at is im-
proving security more generally and part of security is to ensure
that you can properly process and manage and know whose [sic]
coming into the country and if we are just going to have an open
door then the fact is that that is an invitation for trouble in the fu-
ture.34
In the case of the people transferred to Nauru, he stated:
[Y]ou've got to be able to manage people coming into your
country, you've got to be able to control that otherwise it can be
a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a
staging post for terrorist activities ... if you can't control who
comes into your country then that is a security issue. And that is
one of the reasons why the Government is so determined to en-
sure that we can within the law manage the right of people to
come into Australia.5
As well as detaining terrorist suspects, it is also alleged that U.S. au-
thorities interrogate such suspects extraterritorially. Sometimes this
happens within the aforementioned army-run detention facilities such as
in Guantdnamo Bay and Iraq; in Diego Garcfa and Bagram, it is alleged
that the CIA operates "interrogation centers. 36 It is also alleged that in-
terrogation occurs in special CIA installations elsewhere, such as in
Thailand 3'7 and that the basis for these extraterritorial installations is a
secret presidential order issued to the CIA following the attacks of
9/11.38
34. Radio Interview by Derryn Hinch with Peter Reith, Australian Defense Minister
(Sept. 13, 2001), transcript available at http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2001/
1309013.doc [hereinafter Reith].
35. Id.
36. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23 (referring to CIA interrogation centers in Bagram and
Diego Garcfa).
37. Id.
38. According to John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 24,
2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989481, President Bush "signed a secret order
granting new powers to the CIA. According to knowledgeable sources, Bush's directive au-
thorized the CIA to set up a series of secret detention facilities outside the United States."
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As well as extraterritorial detentions operated by the United States
directly, Priest and Gellman assert that "thousands" of "suspected al
Qaeda members and their supporters" have been "arrested and held with
U.S. assistance" in third States.39 According to Van Natta Jr., such States
have included Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Morocco.40 Usually the suspects
have been transferred to the States concerned by. the United States, a
process referred to as "rendering."' Sometimes interrogations are con-
ducted by the foreign authorities;42 in other cases, "US intelligence
agents remain closely involved in the interrogation." 3 One reason cited
for this process of "rendering" to third States for interrogation in those
States is the perceived "cultural affinity" operating between the captives
and those in the countries to which they are transferred." It is suggested
that the United States looks:
to foreign allies more because their intelligence services can de-
velop a culture of intimacy [with the captives] that Americans
cannot. They may use interrogators who speak the captive's
Arabic dialect and often use the prospects of shame and the
reputation of the captive's family to goad the captive into talk-
ing. 5
U.S. officials also express the concern that when suspects are being
transferred from what are regarded as moderate Muslim States (e.g. In-
donesia), there would be a risk of a "backlash from fundamentalist
Islamic groups" within those States if the transfer were to be made to the
United States rather than another "Muslim state" (e.g. Egypt).
46
Moreover, Professor Wedgwood's general consideration about the secu-
rity risk posed by detaining terrorist suspects in the United States is also
invoked to justify interrogating such suspects in third countries.
Not only, then, can States' reasons for conducting an extraterritorial
activity change over time (e.g. the U.K. administration of the Falkland
Islands); States have also used an existing administrative arrangement to
serve an additional purpose, operating concurrently with the original
purpose. So while the United States continues to operate its military
39. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22. See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S.
Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al; Van Natta Jr.,
supra note 23.
40. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
41. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22. See also Van Natta Jr., supra note 23; Amnesty
International, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 1, at 29-32.
42. Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 39; Priest & Gellman, supra note 22.
43. Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 39.
44. Priest & Gelman, supra note 22.
45. Id.
46. Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 39.
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bases in Guantdnamo Bay and Diego Garcia for strategic purposes, it
also (allegedly in the case of Diego Garcia) uses this administrative
presence to detain and interrogate terrorist suspects.
We also see overlaps between the spatial and the personal targets of
the administrative presences. States in the position of the administrative
authority for reasons that can be understood in terms of a spatial target-
the strategic value of controlling Guantdnamo Bay, for example-then
use this position to perform particular administrative activities aimed at a
personal target--detention and interrogation. Equally, States sometimes
undertake extraterritorial action with a personalized target-e.g. the ac-
tions against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the government of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq-which leads to extraterritorial action operating spa-
tially-the belligerent occupation in parts of Afghanistan and Iraq-but
which then involves, in part, particular initiatives against personalized
targets-in Afghanistan, the continued pursuit of Al Qaeda and Bin
Laden, and, in Iraq, the attempts to neutralize the remaining elements of
the Baathist regime and the post-Saddam Hussein insurgency movement.
This is in contrast to other activities, such as in Guantdnamo Bay and
Diego Garcia, where there is no link between the more recent activities
with a personal target-the detainees-and the original, continuing spa-
tial explanation-the value of a strategic presence-for the existence of
the administrative set-up.
These descriptions demonstrate that the site of some of the key in-
ternational policy initiatives by the West, spearheaded by the United
States with the strong support and active involvement of many other
Western States, is outside the territory of these States. Because the two
policies most of these initiatives are variously associated with-the "war
against terror" and the desire in many Western States to increase regula-
tions on the entry of asylum seekers-may well dominate the West's
foreign policy agenda for some time, one may reasonably speculate that
the extraterritorial activities associated with them, having arguably in-
creased since 9/11, are set to continue to at least the same degree as at
present.
III. THE NEED FOR GREATER SCRUTINY
By their nature the extraterritorial initiatives outlined in the previous
section have a direct or indirect impact on the treatment of individuals,
whether through the exercise of control over the territory in which indi-
viduals are located, or through particular acts aimed at individuals
directly: military action; detention; interrogation; forcible transfer; and
preventing freedom of movement. This section considers the extent to
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which this impact is and should be a focus of national and international
attention.
A. Ignoring Extraterritorial Activity
In the Western tradition, the State has a duty to protect individual
rights by virtue of a contract that the members of its community have
entered. 7 One traditional basis on which the community has been under-
stood is in terms of nationality. Contractual theories, by definition, do
not address requirements of justice arising in the context of the interac-
tion between the community (and its officials) and individuals who do
not belong to it. When "belonging" is defined according to nationality,
foreigners are left outside the frame. Thus Locke excludes foreigners
from the social contract and the protection of citizenship rights: "for-
eigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying
the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in con-
science, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet
do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that common-
wealth.""8
Although ideas of rights and their protection through law have
shifted, notably with the introduction of international human rights law,
so that most rights guarantees are not now understood as being tied to
citizenship," contemporary rights discourse is perhaps still focused pre-
dominantly on the nexus between the State and its territory. Rawls'
"theory of justice," for example, concerns "the basic structure of society
47. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 1996)(1651); JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed. 1988)(1690); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
48. LOCKE, supra note 47, at 349.
49. In international human rights law, the shift away from nationality is affected
through conceiving human rights obligations in relation to the State's "jurisdiction" rather
than its own nationals. In the words of the UN Human Rights Committee, discussing the
ICCPR, "each State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to 'all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction' (art. 2, para. 1). In general, the rights set forth in the
Covenant apply to everyone... irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness."
General Comment No. 15, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., para. 1, reprinted in Compila-
tion of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, at 18, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1 (1994) [hereinafter UN HRC General Comment
15]. On this general applicability, see id., passim. The preamble of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man states that "the essential rights of man are not derived from
the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his human per-
sonality." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, A.G. Res. 1591, preamble
(1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 17 (1992). On the rights of aliens in international human rights law, see,
for example, UN HRC General Comment 15, supra note 49, passim.
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conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other so-
cieties. 50
A concern about human rights is often understood exclusively in
terms of a concern about either what a State does in its own territory, or
what other States do in their territories, or both. Equally, to be a "human
rights lawyer" is often understood exclusively in terms of being profes-
sionally concerned with the application of the standards of domestic or
international human rights law governing the relationship between the
State and those within its territory.
This limited focus is illustrated in the scope of activities engaged in
by the two leading human rights organizations in the United States and
the United Kingdom: the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
Liberty (formerly the National Council for Civil Liberties) respectively.
In both cases, the organization in question is the leading non-
governmental organization concerned with the conformity of the State to
human rights standards. This concern, however, is usually limited to
what that State does within its own territory. Thus "with offices in almost
every [U.S.] state" the mission of the ACLU is "to defend and preserve
the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to all people in this country
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States."
'5'
In a similar way, Liberty "identifies current issues it considers cru-
cial to the protection of civil liberties and human rights in this country
and campaigns-through litigation, media and lobbying-to influence gov-
ernment policy. 52 The organization opposes "any abuse of excessive use
of power by the state against its people.' 53
However important the need to safeguard the treatment of individu-
als by a State within its own territory, clearly the existence of the
activities outlined above suggests that this need should not be the exclu-
sive focus of attention. Such a suggestion is bolstered by the fact that by
their nature extraterritorial activities take place in circumstances where
individuals are extremely vulnerable.
B. Greater Risks of Rights Violations in the Extraterritorial Context
In circumstances of plenary military occupation, power is central-
ized in the hands of the occupiers to a much greater extent compared
with peacetime civilian administrations in States with general internal
stability. Moreover, the general circumstances of insecurity and depriva-
50. RAWLS, supra note 47, at 7.
51. American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom is Why We're Here, at I (Fall 1999), at
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=10740.
52. Liberty, Issues, at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/index.shtml.




tion in which foreign State occupations occur, and the extraterritorial
nature of the location for all the activities, means that there may be few,
if any, third parties-journalists, civil society monitors, international or-
ganizations, and less-directly-interested States--on the ground
monitoring the treatment of individuals. As far as occupied Iraq is con-
cerned, the then acting UN High Commissioner of Human Rights
remarked in 2004 that:
it is a stark reality that there was no international oversight and
accountability in respect of the situation that has obtained in Iraq
since the taking of control by Coalition Forces. At its fifty-ninth
session in April 2003, the Commission on Human Rights de-
cided to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Iraq, established in 1991, but to give
him the mandate to inquire into past violations of human rights
under the previous regime. The Special Rapporteur was not
given a specific mandate to monitor the present situation. The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur was discontinued altogether a
year later at the sixtieth session of the Commission. The interna-
tional community was thus left in a situation in which there was
no international scrutiny of human rights in present-day Iraq.
4
In the context of detained terrorist suspects, the nature of the terrorist
threat often leads to calls for greater secrecy about the circumstances of
detention. In the words of Colonel Roger King, spokesman for the U.S.-
led force in Afghanistan, "[e]very detail we give you about how we run
the facility provides information to the enemy about how to be more
successful in resisting if captured."55 Thus, as Priest and Gellman report:
[i]n contrast to the detention center at Guantdnamo Bay, where
military lawyers, news reporters and the Red Cross received oc-
casional access to monitor prisoner conditions and treatment, the
CIA's overseas interrogation facilities are off-limits to outsiders,
and often even to other government agencies...
Free from the scrutiny of military lawyers steeped in the interna-
tional laws of war, the CIA and its intelligence service allies
have the leeway to exert physically and psychologically aggres-
sive techniques...
54. See Report on The Present Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. High Comm. On Hum. Rgts., 61st Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, para. 144, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/4 (2004), available at http:llwww.
unhchr.ch/html/hchr/docs/iraql .pdf [hereinafter UNHCHR/Ramcharan].
55. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
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... the prisoners are denied access to lawyers or organizations,
such as the Red Cross, that could independently assess their
treatment. Even their names are secret. 6
Van Natta Jr. reports that the facilities in the Bagram air base are "off
limits, even to most military personnel. The only descriptions of life in-
side have come from released detainees. '5 7 When compared with the
Guantinamo and Bagram detainees, "far less is known" about the terror-
ist suspects who have been "rendered" to third States, including those
transferred for interrogation with some kind of CIA involvement. 8 Ac-
cording to Van Natta Jr., "even the numbers and locations are a
mystery."5 9 The Economist reports: "American officials claim to have
detained thousands of suspects, including some senior al-Qaeda leaders,
but will not say where, and under what conditions, they are being held."
6
The alleged means through which detainees are transferred to these de-
tention facilities underlines their secret nature; Newsweek journalists
Barry, Hirsh and Isikoff report that "[b]y 2004, the United States was
running a covert charter airline moving CIA prisoners from one secret
facility to another, sources say. The reason? It was judged impolitic (and
too traceable) to use the U.S. Air Force.,
61
Taking these various special factors together, we might say that, all
other things being equal, the risk of human rights violations committed
by the States involved may well be higher in these extraterritorial con-
texts than in the States' own territories.
C. Extreme Measures Taken Against Individuals
The extraterritorial context is not the only factor creating a greater
risk of human rights violations. Those extraterritorial actions concerned
with preventing terrorist threats and/or regulating the movement of asy-
lum seekers are by their nature aimed at taking extreme, extraordinary
measures against individuals. The consequences for the individuals in-
volved if any such actions are unjustified are far more serious when
compared with most other state actions.
Of course, not only do some of these extraterritorial actions serve
purposes that may warrant extraordinary measures; it is also clear that
such extraordinary measures are in fact being taken. In the first place, we
have the detention of individuals. One key link between the 9/11-related
56. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22.
57. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The Pledge, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003, at 47.
61. Barry et al., supra note 38.
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activities and those concerning asylum seekers is an increased recourse
to detention. As Amnesty International points out in relation to the asy-
lum-related activities, "detention appears to be a necessary element" of
the U.K. TPC proposals. 2 Not only is detention itself a serious curtail-
ment of rights for the individuals involved; by its nature it, like the
extraterritorial locus, creates greater opportunities for other rights abuses
to occur.
The April 2004 publication of photographs depicting the abuse of
detainees in the U.S.-operated Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad provides a
graphic illustration of the fact that such opportunities have clearly been
taken. Before considering the nature of the abuses taking place, it is in
order to consider the backdrop to them. A striking feature of post-9/11
discourse has been the suggestion by some mainstream commentators
that the use of practices previously considered beyond the pale even in
extreme situations-specifically, the use of torture and inhuman and de-
grading treatment-should perhaps be considered.63 In an article entitled
Time to Think About Torture in November 2001, Newsweek columnist
Jonathan Alter wrote:
[i]n this autumn of anger, even a liberal can find his thoughts
turning to... torture.
We can't legalize physical torture; it's contrary to American val-
ues. But even as we continue to speak out against human-rights
abuses around the world, we need to keep an open mind about
certain measures to fight terrorism, like court-sanctioned psy-
chological interrogation. And we'll have to think about
transferring some suspects to our less squeamish allies, even if
that's hypocritical. Nobody said this was going to be pretty.
6
4
Professor Alan Dershowitz has stated that he has "no doubt" that in
an extreme "ticking bomb" situation, U.S. authorities would torture.65 In
consequence, for him "[t]he real debate is whether such torture should
take place outside of our legal system or within it. The answer to this
seems clear: if we are to have torture, it should be authorized by law."
6
62. Amnesty International, June 2003, supra note 17, introduction.
63. See the discussion in Jonathan Alter, lime to Think About Torture, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 5, 2001, at 45; Peter Maass, Torture, Tough or Lite: If a Terror Suspect Won't Talk,
Should He Be Made To?, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 9, 2003, § 4, at 4; Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps
Into Discussion By News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at C1; Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
64. Alter, supra note 63 (emphasis added).
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The apparent shift in public debate over the use of torture67 has been
matched by the suggestion that government practice in this area has
changed since 9/11. Priest and Gellman report the remark made by then
head of the CIA Counterterrorism Center at a joint hearing of the House
and Senate intelligence committees on September 26, 2002 that, in deal-
ing with suspected terrorists, "[there was a before 9/11, and there was an
after 9/11 .... After 9/11 the gloves come off."'
Alan Dershowitz reports "I hear from former agents that it [torture]
was done and that it is done., 69 John Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael
Isikoff in Newsweek allege that President Bush authorized a secret order
granting new powers to the CIA in relation to the detention of suspects,
including the entitlement to question them "with unprecedented harsh-
ness."7 As far as interrogations operating extraterritorially, Priest and
Gellman reported in 2002 that "what are known as 'stress and duress'
techniques" are used by the United States on suspects it is detaining at
secret overseas facilities' In the Bagram airbase facility, "[t]hose who
refuse to cooperate.... are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for
hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles ... At times they are held
in awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour
bombardment of lights.72
According to one unnamed official, "If you don't violate someone's
human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job.... I
don't think we want to be promoting a view of zero tolerance on this.
That was the whole problem for a long time with the CIA."" Priest and
Gellman report that:
[a]fter apprehending suspects, U.S. take-down teams-a mix of
military special forces, FBI agents, CIA case officers and local
allies-aim to disorient and intimidate them on the way to de-
tention facilities.
According to Americans with direct knowledge and others who
have witnessed the treatment, captives are often "softened up"
by MPs [military police officers] and U.S. Army Special Forces
67. Of course, the proposals have been robustly challenged by other commentators.
See, e.g., Ends, Means and Barbarity, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 21; Is Torture Ever Justi-
fied?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 2003, at 11.
68. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22 (quoting Cofer Black).
69. Duncan Campbell, US interrogators turn to "torture lite", GUARDIAN, Jan. 25,
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0, 12271,882002,00.html.
70. Barry et al., supra note 38.
71. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22. See also Campbell, supra note 69; Van Natta Jr.,
supra note 23; Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 1, at 10.
72. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22. See also Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
73. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22.
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troops who beat them up and confine them in tiny rooms. The al-
leged terrorists are commonly blindfolded and thrown into walls,
bound in painful positions, subjected to loud noises and deprived
of sleep. The tone of intimidation and fear is the beginning, they
said, of a process of piercing a prisoner's resistance.
The take-down teams often "package" prisoners for transport,
fitting them with hoods and gags, and binding them to stretchers
with duct tape.74
Van Natta Jr. reports that there have been "isolated, if persistent, re-
ports of beatings in some American-operated centers."" Some of the
detainees released from Guantd.namo Bay, notably those returned to the
United Kingdom, have made allegations of abuse conducted during their
detention, including punishment beatings.76
The publication of the Abu Ghraib abuse photographs led to the ad-
mission by U.S. authorities that abuses which had been alleged
previously had taken place at the prison. An official Army report by An-
tonio M. Taguba that was originally secret but widely disseminated at the
start of May 2004 following the publication of the photographs, made
the following findings of fact:
I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police
personnel included the following acts:
" Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on. their
naked feet;
" Videotaping and photographing naked male and female de-
tainees;
* Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit posi-
tions for photographing;
" Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them
naked for several days at a time;
* Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
" Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves
while being photographed and videotaped;
74. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22.
75. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
76. See, e.g., Tania Branigan, Briton Accuses American Captors, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13,
2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4879136-103690,00.html; Tania
Branigan & Rosia Cowan, Freed Briton Tells of Beatings, GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4878264-111575,00.html; David Rose, How
We Survived Jail Hell, OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 2004, at 5, available at http://observer.
guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,,1 168937,00.html.
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* Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them;
* Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag
on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis
to simulate electric torture;
• Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged
to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then
photographing him naked;
• Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck
and having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
• A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
* Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate
and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and se-
verely injuring a detainee;
• Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.77
A confidential report by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) of February 2004, which was subsequently leaked, con-
cluded that the following violations had taken place:
* Brutality against protected persons upon capture and initial
custody, sometimes causing death or serious injury;
• Absence of notification of arrest of persons deprived of their
liberty to their families causing distress among persons de-
prived of their liberty and their families;
• Physical or psychological coercion during interrogation to se-
cure information;
* Prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of daylight
• Excessive and disproportionate use of force against persons
deprived of their liberty resulting in death or injury during
their period of internment. 8
It also found that alleged violations of detainees were not limited to
the Abu Ghraib prison:
77. Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th'Military
Police Brigade, at 16-7 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-abuse_
report.pdf. See also Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Treatment by the Coalition Forces of
Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest,
Internment and Interrogation, at para. 25 (Feb. 1, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
htdocs/pdf/redcrossabuse.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Report, Feb. 1, 2004].
78. ICRC Report, Feb. 1, 2004, supra note 77, Executive Summary.
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[t]he main places of internment where mistreatment allegedly
took place included battle group unit stations; the military intel-
ligence sections of Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib Correctional
Facility; Al-Baghdadi; Heat Base and Habbania Camp in
Ramadi governorate; Tikrit holding area (former Saddam Hus-
sein Islamic School); a former train station in AI-Khaim, near
the Syrian border, turned into a military base; the Ministry of
Defense and Presidential Palace in Baghdad; the former mukha-
barat office in Basrah, as well as several Iraqi police stations in
.Baghdad.9
Although the U.S. administration position on these abuses is that
they were isolated incidents conducted by low-level soldiers or Military
Police [MPs] not acting as part of a coordinated system sanctioned
within the military, this "few bad apples" explanation was placed into
question by both the ICRC and mainstream U.S. journalists. In discuss-
ing these allegations, Pierre KrahenbUhl, ICRC Director of Operations,
stated that "[w]e were dealing here with a broad pattern, not individual
acts. There was a pattern and a system."8°
The aforementioned ICRC report concluded that:
persons deprived of their liberty face the risk of being subjected
to a process of physical and psychological coercion, in some
cases tantamount to torture, in the early stages of the internment
process.
During internment, persons deprived of their liberty also risk be-
ing victims of disproportionate and excessive use of force on the
part of detaining authorities attempting to restore order in the
81event of unrest or to prevent escapes.
One typical report alleging a coordinated strategy is by Newsweek
journalists John Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff:
the single most iconic image to come out of the abuse scandal-
that of a hooded man standing naked on a box, arms outspread,
with wires dangling from his fingers, toes and penis-may do a
lot to undercut the administration's case that this was the work
of a few criminal MPs. That's because the practice shown in that
photo is an arcane torture method known only to veterans of the
79. Id., para 3.
80. BBC News, Red Cross Saw "Widespread Abuse" (May 8, 2004), at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/lhi/world/americas/3694521 .stm.
81. ICRC Report, Feb. 1, 2004, supra note 77, paras. 59, 61.
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interrogation trade. "Was that something that [an MP] dreamed
up by herself? Think again," says Darius Rejali, an expert on the
use of torture by democracies. "That's a standard torture. It's
called 'the Vietnam.' But it's not common knowledge. Ordinary
American soldiers did this, but someone taught them."
Who might have taught them? Almost certainly it was their su-
periors up the line. Some of the images from Abu Ghraib, like
those of naked prisoners terrified by attack dogs or humiliated
before grinning female guards, actually portray "stress and du-
ress" techniques officially approved at the highest levels of the
government for use against terrorist suspects.82
The journalists allege that "as a means of pre-empting a repeat of
9/11, Bush, along with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft, signed off on a secret system of detention and
interrogation that opened the door to such methods."83
There have also been allegations of mistreatment by U.K. soldiers in
Iraq, which have led to cases currently pending in the English Courts. s
According to the solicitor for the complainants in one of these cases, the
allegations include "a man beaten to death in custody, another beaten in
custody and made to swim a river and drowned because of his injuries, a
woman shot in the head while eating her supper in her home with her
family, [and] another man shot dead while he prepared for morning
prayers. 85
These allegations, which are not limited to the treatment of detain-
ees, echo the broader observations of the then acting UN High
Commissioner of Human Rights in 2004 concerning negative impact on
human rights generally of the Coalition presence in Iraq.1
6
As far as the "renderings" to third States, many of the third States
involved have a well-documented history of using interrogation methods
that fail to conform to international human rights law standards8 7 Jordan
and Morocco, for example, have been criticized by the U.S. State De-
82. Barry et al., supra note 38. See also, e.g., Sidney Blumenthal, The Bush Orthodoxy
is in Shreds, GUARDIAN, May 27, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/
story/0,3604,1225600,00.html.
83. Barry et al., supra note 38.
84. See Richard Norton-Taylor & Steven Morris, Court Battle Over Iraqi Deaths,
GUARDIAN, May 5, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/
0,2763,1209704,00.html; Richard Norton-Taylor, High Court to Hear Claims of Unlawful
Killing by Soldiers, GUARDIAN, May 6, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
intemational/story/0,3604,1210421,00.html. See also R (on the application of Al-Skeini and
others) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2004] All E.R. 197 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 2004).
85. Norton-Taylor, supra note 84 (quoting Phil Shiner, of Public Interest Lawyers).
86. See UNHCHR/Ramcharan, supra note 54.
87. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22; Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
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partment for the practice of arbitrary and unlawful detentions and abuse
(in the case of Jordan) and outright torture (in the case of Morocco).88
Moreover, there have been specific allegations made of torture commit-
ted against such "rendered" suspects:
[iun one case in Morocco, lawyers for three Saudis and seven
Moroccans accused of plotting to blow up American and British
ships in the Strait of Gibraltar last summer said their clients
were tortured. Moroccan officials denied that physical torture
was used but acknowledged using sleep and light deprivation
and serial teams of interrogators until the suspects broke.89
These allegations might lead some to conclude that the relative lack
of scrutiny operating with respect to extraterritorial detention and inter-
rogation, rather than being merely an unintended consequence of
choosing an extraterritorial locus, was in fact one of the reasons for this
choice (whether in transferring individuals to this locus, or retaining
them in this locus once captured there). Detaining terrorist suspects ex-
traterritorially would enable certain forms of treatment of such
suspects-from prolonged detention without judicial review to interroga-
tion techniques that involve the infliction of physical harm-that would
lead to greater general public objection were they to take place domesti-
cally. Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn in the Washington Post quote
an unnamed U.S. diplomat stating that after 9/11, the movement of ter-
rorist suspects to extraterritorial locations "allows us to get information
from terrorists in a way we can't do on U.S. soil."' According to News-
week journalists Barry, Hirsh and Isikoff:
[a]t a classified briefing for senators not long after 9/11, CIA Di-
rector George Tenet was asked whether Washington was going
to get governments known for their brutality to turn over Qaeda
suspects to the United States. Congressional sources told
NEWSWEEK that Tenet suggested it might be better sometimes
for such suspects to remain in the hands of foreign authorities,
who might be able to use more aggressive interrogation meth-
ods.9'
88. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Jordan
(2003), at http:lwww.state.gov/g/drl/rlslhrrpt/2003/27930.htm; U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Morocco (2003), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/hrrpt/2003/27934.htm.
89. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
90. Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 39.
91. Barry et al., supra note 38.
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D. Official Responses to Abuse Allegations
The apparent shift in the public debate on the use of torture and the
allegations about "stress and duress" techniques reported in the Washing-
ton Post in 2002 led the Legal Counsel of the U.S. Defense Department,
William J. Haynes II, in response to a letter by Senator Patrick Leahy to
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, to take the remarkable step
of publicly stating that "United States policy is to treat all detainees and
conduct all interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consis-
tent with its commitments to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in domestic law and under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment." 92 On the United States' obligations in domestic law and
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) with respect to torture,
Haynes stated that the United States "does not permit, tolerate or con-
done any such torture by its employees under any circumstances., 93 He
insisted that "credible allegations of illegal conduct by U.S. personnel
will be investigated and, as appropriate, reported to the proper authori-
ties.... Should any investigation indicate that illegal conduct has
occurred, the appropriate authorities would have a duty to take action to
ensure that any individuals responsible are held accountable in accor-
dance with the law."94
President George W. Bush stated on June 26, 2003, on the occasion
of the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, that "[t]he
United States is committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and
we are leading this fight by example.""
When the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison were released in
2004, the Bush Administration initiated various official enquiries and
investigations. Commentators are concerned, however, that these are in-
96
adequate because they are not independent of the Administration. As
Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt in the New York Times report, "[n]o
92. Letter from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to
Senator Patrick J. Leahy 1 (June 25, 2003), at http://hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf
[hereinafter Haynes.] See also Letter from William J. Haynes H, General Counsel, U.S. De-
partment of Defense, to Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2,
2003), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/dodltr040203.pdf; Letter from Senator Patrick
Leahy, to Condoleeza Rice, U.S. National Security Advisor 2 (June 2, 2003) (text mistakenly
states 2004), at http://hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-rice.pdf [hereinafter Leahy].
93. Haynes, supra note 92.
94. Id. at 2. Haynes also gave undertakings with respect to transferring individuals to
third States, see id.
95. President George W. Bush, Statement at the United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html.
96. See Steven Lee Myers & Eric Schmitt, Wide Gaps Seen in U.S. Inquiries on Prison
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,2004, at Al.
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investigation completely independent of the Pentagon exists to determine
what led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, and so far there has been no
groundswell in Congress or elsewhere to create one."97
Official statements about the non-use of torture and inhuman and
degrading treatment8 (if this is indeed what the Haynes letter amounts
to) and the "few bad apples" explanation for the atrocities in Abu Ghraib
prison may be true; equally, benign reasons given for the use of the ex-
traterritorial locus (e.g. Professor Wedgwood's security concerns) and
involvement of foreign authorities (e.g. the cultural affinity argument)
for the detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects may indeed be
the only motivation for this use and involvement. The problem, of
course, is that at present one has no means of knowing. One is expected,
rather, to take the reassurances on trust. As Amnesty International stated,
"[tihe detainees held in Guant6.namo, Bagram and elsewhere are at the
mercy of the executive.""
This particular move, of governments seemingly asking for blind
faith as far as their extraterritorial treatment of detainees is concerned,
reflects the broader rhetoric associated with the "war on terror," illus-
trated in the following remark by the U.K. Prime Minister:
the threat is there and demands our attention. That is the struggle
which engages us. It is a new type of war. It will rest on intelli-
gence to a greater degree than ever before. It demands a
difference [sic] attitude to our own interests. It forces us to act
even when so many comforts seem unaffected, and the threat so
far off, if not illusory. In the end, believe your political leaders or
not, as you will. But do so, at least having understood their
minds.'Ym
The value of external scrutiny is sometimes acknowledged when States
point out that in relation to certain extraterritorial actions possibilities
exist for the ICRC to visit prisoners. The ICRC has repeatedly visited
detainees in Guantdnamo, Bagram, and Iraq.' °' The ICRC, however, usu-
ally operates on the basis of confidentiality in this regard. As a Trial
97. Id.
98. For other such statements, see the officials quoted in Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
99. Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 1, at 12.
100. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism (Mar. 5,
2004), available at http://www.number-I0.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp [hereinafter Blair
statement, Mar. 5, 2004].
101. For an overview of the ICRC activities in relation to detainees held by the United
States in Bagram and GuantAnano see Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, US Detention Related to
the Events of 11 September 2001 and its Aftermath-The Role of the ICRC (May 14, 2004),
available at http://www.icrc.orgfWeb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList74n3596F146DABIAO8CI25
6E9400469F48 [hereinafter ICRC Statement, May 14, 2004].
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Chamber of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia reported in the Simig case in connection with ICRC testi-
mony before the Tribunal, the ICRC:
places particular emphasis on the importance of respecting the
principles of... impartiality and neutrality, as well as the need
for confidentiality in the performance of its functions. The ICRC
notes that, by adhering to these principles, it has been able to
win the trust of warring parties to armed conflicts and bodies
engaged in hostilities, in the absence of which it would not be
able to perform the tasks assigned to it under international hu-
manitarian law. Further, the ICRC asserts that in carrying out its
mandate it undertakes a duty of confidentiality towards the war-
ring parties. An essential feature of that duty is that ICRC
officials and employees do not testify about matters which come
to their attention in the course of performing their functions. The
ICRC position is based on its assessment that, if it were per-
ceived that there was any likelihood or possibility that ICRC
staff would testify, the warring parties would deny the ICRC ac-
cess to their facilities."l
As Lavoyer states, when ICRC representatives identify violations of
humanitarian law:
the ICRC intervenes with the party concerned, explains the vio-
lation, and tries to obtain a change in its behavior. The ICRC
does not act as a judge, but rather endeavors to initiate a con-
structive dialogue with the parties to a conflict. This is only
possible if its interventions are kept discreet and confidential.' 3
It follows, then, that as the ICRC has stated in the context of detain-
ees held extraterritorially by the United States in the context of the "war
on terror," "[t]he ICRC's lack of public comment on detention issues
must... not be interpreted to mean that it has no concerns.''°
There are two circumstances where the confidentiality rule might not
be complied with. In the first place, when the ICRC's confidential repre-
sentations are leaked, the organization sometimes comments publicly on
the substantive content of the leaked information. For example, when the
report concerning detainees in Iraq extracted above was leaked and
102. Prosecutor v. Simiq Case IT-95-9, Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule
73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, ICTY, Trial Chamber, para. 14 (July
27, 1999), available at http://www.un.orglictylsiniicltrialc3/decision-e/90727EV59549.htm.
103. Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, The International Committee of the Red Cross-How Does
it Protect Victims ofArmed Conflict ?, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 287, 289 (1997).
104. ICRC Statement, May 14, 2004, supra note 101.
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quoted in the Wall Street Journal in May 2004, Pierre Kriihenbifhl, the
ICRC's Director of Operations, spoke to journalists to clarify certain
factual details relating to the report and to confirm that, as stated in the
report, some of the activities identified by the ICRC in Iraq "were tanta-
mount to torture .... I think you will have different definitions of what
torture amounts to; what we feel, and I think what you see from the pho-
tographs ... is that there were clearly instances of degrading and
inhumane treatment."'0 5
This situation is, of course, consistent with the confidentiality rule in
that the ICRC is only speaking publicly to clarify details of a report that
has already entered the public domain. It is notable that in the same press
encounter Kriihenbiihl stated that in the light of the confidentiality rule
the ICRC was "unhappy" that the report had been made public.'0
6
The second instance where the ICRC might make a public statement
is outlined by Lavoyer thus: "[i]f serious violations of humanitarian law
continue to occur even after the ICRC has made representations, the
ICRC reserves the right to speak out and denounce such violations,
though this must be in the interest of the victims themselves."'
7
The ICRC has expressed concerns relating to the detainees in
Guantdnamo and Bagram in two areas: in the first place, it regrets that
the detentions are not operating under a legal framework; in the second
place, it has stated that its "observations regarding certain aspects of the
conditions of detention and treatment of detainees in Bagram and
Guantinamo have not yet been adequately addressed."1 8
So we have a statement of non-compliance in relation to detention
and treatment but no detail of the factual occurrences giving rise to this
and no explanation of how the law is being violated. As a process for
subjecting detention and treatment to rigorous scrutiny involving de-
tailed public disclosure of both factual circumstances and conformity to
the law, it is necessarily limited. Moreover, it only operates when access
to detainees is provided, yet in fact the ICRC has complained that this
has not happened in the case of secret extraterritorial detention facilities.
The ICRC stated that it:
Has... repeatedly appealed to the American authorities for access
to people detained in undisclosed locations .... Beyond Bagram
and Guantdnamo Bay, the ICRC is increasingly concerned about
105. Pierre Krifhenbifhl, Iraq: ICRC Explains Position Over Detention Report and
Treatment of Prisoners, Statement at Press Conference at International Committee of the
Red Cross' Headquarters (May 7, 2004), at http://www.icrc.orglWeb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
5YRMYC?OpenDocument [hereinafter Krihenbiihll.
106. Id.
107. Lavoyer, supra note 103, at 290.
108. ICRC Statement, May 14, 2004, supra note 101.
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the fate of an unknown number of people captured as part of the
so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations.
For the ICRC, obtaining information on these detainees and ac-
cess to them is an important humanitarian priority.09
One ideal of the democratic tradition in whose name many of the
States engaged in the extraterritorial activities discussed operate is that a
State should not be taken on its word in such matters, nor given the
benefit of the doubt. In a now classic statement of this idea, James Madi-
son wrote:
[i]f men were angels, no government would be necessary. If an-
gels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great diffi-
culty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
controul the governed; and in the next place oblige it to controul
itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary con-
troul on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions."°
Given that the extraterritorial locus often creates greater opportuni-
ties for States to avoid scrutiny of their treatment of individuals, one
should not have to rely exclusively on assurances given by the govern-
ments of those States and the possibility in extreme circumstances of
attenuated intimations of inappropriate treatment from the ICRC, to be
sure that the States involved are not taking what they perceive to be ad-
vantages from such opportunities. In a joint letter issued in response to
the torture statement by President Bush, the leading U.S. human rights
NGOs and torture victim treatment centers remarked that "[t]he wel-
come message that the Bush Administration has sent today would be
reinforced if it granted full access to independent human rights monitors
to assure the world that this pledge is being fully redeemed in prac-
tice."'''
109. Id.
110. James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST 347, 349 (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (1788).
111. William Schulz et al., Human Rights Watch, Bush Administration Rules Out Using
Cruel Treatment to Fight Terrorism: A Joint Statement Concerning UN Torture Victims Recog-




E. The "threat of a bad example"
Current and recent extraterritorial actions are also especially signifi-
cant because they are being led by the most powerful States. The "war
on terror," the basis on which many of the key post-9/11 activities are
being conducted, is of course a U.S.-led initiative involving most of the
other major world powers." 2 The invasion and occupation of Iraq was
conducted by the world's most powerful State and the United Kingdom,
with some limited assistance by other somewhat less powerful States.
The refugee policy initiatives are being promoted within the European
Union (in particular by the United Kingdom) and by Australia.
Because of the power enjoyed by the States prosecuting them, these
activities constitute key components of the mainstream international po-
litical agenda since 9/11. As such, their significance extends to
potentially influencing the actions of other States. In relation to the situa-
tion in Guantdinamo Bay, Johan Steyn, a member of the Judicial
Committee of the House of Lords, the most senior court in the United
Kingdom, asks "what must authoritarian regimes, or countries with du-
bious human rights records, make of the example set by the most
powerful of all democracies?"" 3 Professor Harold Koh reports that "[i]n
Indonesia, the army has cited America's use of Guantdnamo to propose
building an offshore prison camp on Nasi Island to hold suspected terror-
ists from Aceh."" 4 This forms part of the broader consequences of the
precedent-setting significance of certain aspects of U.S.-led policies un-
der the "war on terror" which have been described by Amnesty
International as the "threat of a bad example."
' 15
112. The phrase "war on terror" was used by President George W. Bush in his statement
responding to the attacks on September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush, Statement by the
President in his Address to the Nation on September 11, 2001 (Sept. 11, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/2001l 911-16.html. See also Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Address on the State of the Union (Jan. 29, 2002), http:/lwww.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129- 11.html. For an outline of the various
activities involved in the war on terror, see President George W. Bush, President Bush Reaf-
firms Resolve to War on Terror, Iraq and Afghanistan (Mar. 19, 2004), at http:l/www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040319-3.html. For commentary on the phrase, see,
for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032-37
(2004), Frfdfric Mfgret, "War"? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 361 (2002).
113. Johan Steyn, Guantdnamo Bay: the Legal Black Hole, 27th FA. Mann Lecture
(Nov. 27, 2003), in 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 14 (2004).
114. Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, EcONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2003, at 24, avail-
able at http://economist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story-ID=2173160 (an edited
version of The United States and Human Rights After September 11, John Galway Foster
Lecture, London, 2003).
115. Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2003, supra note 1.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
F. The Need for Greater Scrutiny
What we see, then, is a series of important extraterritorial activities
conducted by States operating at the vanguard of international public
policy since 9/11. Not only do these activities by their nature impact on
individuals, they do so in circumstances where greater intrusions on in-
dividuals are often considered necessary and in contexts where
individuals may be particularly vulnerable and third parties prevented
from monitoring the behavior of the States involved. Any one of these
aggravating factors would be important enough to warrant greater scru-
tiny of the activities of States overseas; taken together, this case is surely
compelling.
Just as in recent years greater attention in the West has focused on
individuals, from pedophiles to tax dodgers and money launderers, who
travel overseas to engage in activities that would be more difficult to per-
form at home, it is also necessary to give greater attention to what States
are up to abroad given the relative lack of scrutiny and greater opportu-
nity for abuse that often prevails in the extraterritorial context. Greater
commitment is needed to the complex and broad-ranging business of
transforming the political culture both nationally and internationally in
order to create greater transparency and accountability in relation to state
actions overseas.
Those surveying a State's adherence to human rights standards
should not stop at the frontiers of that State. The ACLU has taken a pub-
lic position on the U.S. treatment of detainees held extraterritorially,
notably in Guantdinamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan." 6 This focus outside
U.S. territorial boundaries should be further extended both territorially
and in terms of subject-matter, beyond high profile destinations and clear
cases of extreme rights violations to the everyday circumstances of for-
eign territorial administration throughout the world and its impact on all
human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights and civil
and political rights other than the right to be free from torture and inhu-
man and degrading treatment.
G. Human Rights Law as a Scrutiny Mechanism
One limited method offering the potential for scrutinizing the impact
of States' activities with respect to individuals is the framework of law
regulating the relationship between the individual and the State, classi-
fied in various ways in municipal legal systems (e.g. "civil liberties,"
116. See, e.g., Letter from American Civil Liberties Union, to President George W. Bush




"due process," "human rights") and as "human rights law" in interna-
tional law. So the letter by Senator Leahy that prompted Counsel
Haynes' letter asked inter alia about U.S. conformity to the law prohibit-
ing torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.1 '7
Significantly, Haynes' reply is limited to answering this particular
question about conformity to the law. The only issue covered is whether
interrogations are consistent with U.S. obligations in federal and interna-
tional law with respect to inhuman and degrading treatment; it is only
"such torture"-torture prohibited by applicable federal and interna-
tional law-that the U.S. does not permit, tolerate, or condone.
Similarly, only allegations of illegal activity will be investigated and, if
appropriate, lead to further action. Haynes limits his comments on the
applicable law to the general question of which areas of federal and in-
ternational law concerning torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
are generally applicable to government officials.
Crucially, Haynes fails to clarify a further issue: is this law in play
when the United States acts overseas? The reference to "all interroga-
tions, wherever they may occur" may be an empty one if Haynes does
not regard the relevant areas of law operating in a similarly expansive
fashion. The pledge to investigate allegations of illegal conduct is fol-
lowed by a remark that "[iun this connection" an investigation about
deaths in Bagram is "still in progress.' '1 8 The ambiguous nature of "ille-
gal"-specifically, whether it covers only infringements of internal
military law applicable to U.S. soldiers, or also the other obligations ap-
plicable to the United States in federal and international law-means,
however, that we cannot draw from this remark a conclusion either way
about whether Haynes regards these broader obligations to be in play.
It is perhaps notable that whereas some of the questions put by Sena-
tor Leahy in the original letter did indeed ask for clarification of
conformity to the law, others were concerned simply with whether
particular practices-not defined in a legal sense-were taking place. In
this regard, Leahy observed the following:
[I]n its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the
State Department has repeatedly condemned many of the
"stress and duress" interrogation techniques that U.S. person-
nel are alleged to have used in Afghanistan. Can you confirm
that the United States is not employing the specific methods of
117. Leahy, supra note 92.
118. Haynes, supra note 92, at 2.
Spring 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
interrogation that the State Department has condemned in coun-
tries such as Egypt, Iran, Eritrea, Libya, Jordan and Burma? 1 9
Haynes responded that because "it would not be appropriate to catalogue
the interrogation techniques used by U.S. personnel in fighting interna-
tional terrorism.., we cannot comment on specific cases or practices.' '2 °
If Haynes had made any free-standing (i.e. non-legal) comments
about extraterritorial practices, we might have been able to infer from his
other comments about conformity to federal and international law con-
cerning the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment that there was a nexus between this law and the practices
concerned-specifically, that particular practices were or were not being
conducted because they were or were not permitted by these areas of law
(although even this inference would involve according the benefit of the
doubt). Absent such remarks, or indeed an explicit remark that these ar-
eas of law apply extraterritorially, the statement leaves things unclear not
only in terms of whether the alleged practices are taking place but also in
terms of whether the government regards the areas of law discussed to be
applicable, thereby operating to regulate any such practices.
Haynes' reassurances, then, only have purchase if a prior issue-left
unexamined in the letter-is clarified. Does the legal framework regulat-
ing the treatment of individuals by States operate when States act outside
their territory? The U.S. government regards itself bound by federal and
international law when it comes to the practice of torture and inhuman
and degrading treatment and punishment, but does it regard these areas
of law applicable to its activities overseas and is it correct in its position
in this regard?
IV. THE LEGAL BLACK HOLE
A. Legal Vacuum Concerns
A striking feature of the public discussion about some of the extra-
territorial activities covered above, particularly the detention and
interrogation of the terrorist suspects in Guantdnamo Bay, is the sugges-
tion that they somehow occur in a legal vacuum as far as legal standards
governing their effect on individuals are concerned. Professor Harold
Koh has referred to Guantdnamo Bay as an "extra legal zone.' 2' Priest
and Gellman describe the secret overseas detention centers as being
119. Leahy, supra note 92, at 2.
120. Haynes, supra note 92, at 2.
121. Koh, supra note 114.
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places "where U.S. due process does not apply;,1 22 Van Natta Jr. de-
scribes them as "isolated locations outside the jurisdiction of American
law." 23 Johan Steyn stated that the detainees in Guantdnamo Bay were
"beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts' and that
the situation there constituted a "legal black hole. '1n In the Abbasi case
concerning the U.K. government's efforts in relation to Feroz Abbasi,
one of its nationals held in Guantd.namo, the English Court of Appeal
stated that "[w]hat appears to us to be objectionable is that Mr Abbasi
should be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the
United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of his detention before any court or tribunal."'
126
In the context of camps housing asylum seekers, Amnesty Interna-
tional has argued that, in the refugee status determinations that would
occur in the TPCs proposed by the United Kingdom, the individuals af-
fected "would be exposed to a procedure which would accord them
lesser rights in off-territory processing, not least of which would be the
practical difficulties in pursuing appeal rights .... Such difficulties can
render appeal rights meaningless."'27
Thus arguments are made to the effect that few-or even no-legal
standards exist by which to judge whether the restrictions placed on
rights in these extraterritorial situations are justified, and/or, in the refu-
gee context, to challenge refugee status decisions made in the
extraterritorial locus.
Despite the absolutist nature of some of the designations discussed
(e.g. "black hole"), one might speculate that at least in some cases com-
mentators are concerned with the non-application of certain areas of law
rather than all law. In the case of Guant.namo Bay, for example, the
general designations are often used to speak to one or more narrower
contentions: (1) that guarantees under the U.S. Constitution, notably re-
lating to habeas corpus, do not apply outside U.S. territory; 28 (2) that the
122. Priest & Gellman, supra note 22.
123. Van Natta Jr., supra note 23.
124. Steyn, supra note 113, at 8.
125. Id. (This is the title of the lecture given by Johan Steyn at the 27th F.A. Mann Lec-
ture).
126. Abbasi & Anor. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs &
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ. 159, para. 66 (C.A. 2002).
127. Amnesty International, June 2003, supra note 17, §§ 3.2, 6.2.2.6.
128. In Gherebi v Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected the U.S. Government's contention that habeas jurisdiction was pre-
cluded in a case relating to the indefinite detention of uncharged foreign nationals captured in
Afghanistan by U.S. forces and transferred to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantlnamo, Cuba,
without rights to challenge their detention in any court of the United States or any other tribu-
nal. The Court held that "territorial jurisdiction" was sufficient in this case and that in any case
for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction Guantdnamo is a part of the sovereign territory of the
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U.S. qualification of Al Qaeda members as "unlawful combatants," and
thereby supposedly not entitled to the protections accorded to prisoners
of war in international humanitarian law (IHL), removes most of the pro-
tections such individuals would enjoy under IHL;129 and (3) that the
procedures adopted for determining the status of detainees, the remedies
available for challenging these determinations, and the military tribunals
created to try certain detainees are conceived in a manner that does not
conform to appropriate standards of justice.3 0 In June 2004, the U.S. Su-
United States. This contradicted the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Al Odah v United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), which held that
Cuba-not the United States-had sovereignty over Guantdnamo, and that the petitioners
could not invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to test the constitutionality or the legality of
restraints on their liberty. Whilst the latter decision was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)-which held that the U.S. courts do have jurisdiction
to consider the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection
with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantdnamo Bay-two recent decisions by different fed-
eral judges in Washington D.C. have interpreted the decision of the Supreme Court in Rasul v.
Bush differently and again have given divergent answers to the question of whether foreign
citizens who have been imprisoned in GuantAnamo, most of whom have been without access
to lawyers or the courts, are entitled to due process of law. In Khalid v Bush, 355 E Supp.2d
311 (D.D.C. 2005), District Judge Leon interpreted Rasul narrowly to mean that detainees
may file papers in court, not that they have any rights courts can enforce; whereas, in In re
Guantinamo Detainee Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236 (D.D.C Jan. 31, 2005), District
Judge Green reasoned that it would make no sense for the Supreme Court to have gone to such
lengths in Rasul merely to require a pointless exercise of jurisdiction under the ancient writ of
habeas corpus if the Guantdnamo prisoners had no rights.
129. For the Administration's position as to the inapplicability to persons captured in
Afghanistan of the prisoner of war protections of the Geneva Conventions, see George W.
Bush, Memorandum on Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002),
at http://pegc.no-ip.info/archive/WhiteHouse/bushmemo_20020207_ed.pdf. See also Ari
Fleischer, White House Press Secretary Announcement of President Bush's Determination re:
Legal Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7 2002), at http://www.state.govl
s/l/38727.htm.; Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision
Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoner of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda
and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), at http://pegc.no-ip.info/archivelWhiteHouse/gonzales-
memo_20020125.pdf; White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantdnamo (Feb. 7
2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.htrrl [hereinafter
White House Fact Sheet]. In July 2004, the U.S. Administration established a procedure en-
visaged to determine the status of each individual detainee under international humanitarian
law. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(July 7, 2004), at http://www.defenselink.millnews/Jul2004/d2OO4O7O7review.pdf, Secretary
of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy
Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (July 29, 2004), at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ju12004/d20040730comb.pdf. Note however that U.S. courts
have found that the Status Review Tribunals do not satisfy the right of any captured combatant
under Art. 5, Geneva Convention III 1949 to have his status determined by a competent tribu-
nal. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Guantdnamo
Detainee Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236 (D.D.C. Jan.31, 2005).
130. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001), issued by
President Bush provides that non-U.S. nationals designated by the President under the Order
will be tried by Military Commissions. This Order has been implemented by the Department
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preme Court determined that U.S. courts can assert jurisdiction with re-
spect to the detainees in Guantdnamo Bay, and U.S. nationals designated
as "enemy combatants" are entitled to challenge the factual basis for
their detention before a neutral decision maker.'
The "legal black hole" designations are, therefore, often invoked in
relation to particular areas of law and have, to a certain extent, turned out
to be unfounded given the 2004 decisions of the Supreme Court. The
designations retain purchase, however, in reflecting a general concern
that in some way, and to varying degrees, the applicability of those legal
norms considered necessary in order to provide guarantees in relation to
the treatment of individuals is somehow limited, either partially or in
full, in the extraterritorial context. Equally, there is concern that the op-
eration of judicial and political mechanisms existing to scrutinize States'
conformity to these standards is also somehow limited in this context,
for example through the bounded jurisdictional competence of domestic
courts. The "legal black hole" idea speaks to a fear that, when States
move away from their own territories, they somehow also affect a partial
or complete move away from the arena of necessary legal regulation as
far as the treatment of individuals is concerned.
B. The International Legal Black Hole Assertion
As far as international law is concerned, the debate about the appli-
cability of human rights standards to the coalition presence in Iraq, and
of Defense. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for
Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20O20321ord.pdf.
The rules of procedure applicable before the Military Commissions have subsequently been
given more detail by a series of Instructions issued by the Department of Defense. See De-
partment of Defense, Military Commission Instructions No. 1, 2, 5, 7 (Apr. 30, 2003); Military
Commission Instructions No. 3, 6 (Apr. 15, 2004); Military Commission Instructions No. 4, 8
(Aug. 31, 2004); Military Commission Instruction No. 9 (Dec. 26, 2003); at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/conmmissions-instructions.html. On the procedures created to
determine the status of individual detainees see Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal, supra note 129.
131. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) concerns the jurisdictional issue (see the
discussion of this and other relevant cases, supra note 128); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004) concerns the entitlements of "enemy combatants." In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344
F. Supp.2d 152, 168 (D.D.C. 2004) criticism was made of the fairness of the military commis-
sions in relation to the power of the appointing authority or the presiding officer to exclude the
accused from hearings and deny him access to evidence presented against him. The judge
held, however, that the military commissions were in any case illegal in this regard insofar as
they deviated from the procedure applicable to normal courts martial under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. Id. at 168-72. The court also held that the provisions for review were not
open to criticism as a matter of domestic law. Id. at 167. The court did not feel it necessary to
rule at that time on other questions relating to the fairness of the military commissions. Id. at
172-73.
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the U.S. detention of terrorist suspects in Guantdnamo, has been domi-
nated by discussions about the applicability of humanitarian law to so-
called "enemy combatants."'32 The only instance where international
human rights law has been discussed in relation to these activities has
been in the question of the definition of torture and inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, following the leaked U.S. Justice Department memos
challenging the established wisdom on this issue and potentially broad-
ening the range of practices that could be considered lawful here.
The meaning and scope of application of these two areas of interna-
tional law relating to individual rights is of course vitally important, but
an exclusive focus on them ignores the way in which other rights in in-
ternational human rights law, for example the rights contained in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)-are potentially relevant to the activities of States in other
countries.'33 The right to food in Article 11 of the ICESCR, for example,
is clearly relevant to the conduct of the occupation of Iraq;M equally, the
right to a fair trial in Article 9 of the ICCPR is key as far as the prosecu-
tion of alleged terrorists.'
Moreover, within this broader corpus of law, there is a third argu-
ment of inapplicability being put forward by the United States and the
United Kingdom which has just as serious a potential impact in attenuat-
ing the legal protections accorded to individuals in all of the
extraterritorial activities engaged in by these two states, but which has
unfortunately not been given the attention it deserves. Although both the
United Kingdom and the United States are parties to the ICCPR, neither
State appears to have entered a derogation to the Covenant with respect
to its occupation and administration of Iraq, and the United States has
not done so in relation to its facilities in Guantinamo Bay. Moreover, the
United Kingdom has not entered a derogation to the European Convention
of Human Rights (ECHR) in relation to its presence in Iraq. If the ICCPR
132. On the status and the rights of Al Qaeda detainees, who have been designated
"unlawful combatants" rather than "prisoners of war" by the United States, see supra note 129
and, for commentary, George H. Aldrich, Editorial Comment, The Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the
Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2003); Knut Dormann, The
Legal Situation of UnlawfullUnprivileged Combatants, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003);
Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328
(2002); White House Fact Sheet, supra note 129.
133. For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of the main international human
rights instruments, see, for example, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
134. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, art. 11,993 U.N.T.S. 3.




and the ECHR are applicable to these States in Iraq and to the United
States in Guantdnamo, one would imagine that the United States and the
United Kingdom would regard the entering of some kind of derogation as
required in order for them to carry out some of the activities they consid-
ered necessary in either place, for example prolonged detention without
trial. Why, then, do the United States and the United Kingdom seem not
to consider their obligations in these treaties applicable?
According to a secret memo prepared for the Department of Defense
in March 2003 and leaked in June 2004, "[t]he United States has main-
tained consistently that the [ICCPR] does not apply outside the United
States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that it does
not apply to operations of the military during an international armed
conflict."136 Here, then, applicability is rejected on two alternative bases;
in reverse order, these are: (1) subject matter-the Covenant does not
apply to operations of the military during international armed conflict;
and (2) territorial-the Covenant does not apply to the United States
outside its territory.
The United Kingdom position appears to be different. As far as Iraq
is concerned, Adam Ingram, the U.K. Armed Forces Minister, wrote to
Adam Price, a UK Member of Parliament, on April 7, 2004 in the fol-
lowing terms:
The European Convention on Human Rights is intended to apply
in a regional context in the legal space of the Contracting States.
It was not designed to be applied throughout the world and was
not intended to cover the activities of a signatory in a country
which is not signatory to the Convention. The ECHR can have
no application to the activities of the UK in Iraq because the
citizens of Iraq had no rights under the ECHR prior to the mili-
tary action by the Coalition Forces. Further, although the UK
Armed Forces are an occupying power for the purposes of the
Geneva Convention, it does not follow that the UK exercises the
degree of control that is necessary to bring those parts of Iraq





Presumably the Minister is using the term "signatory" to refer to a
State that has signed and ratified the Convention. A similar position also
136. U.S. Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in
the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Consid-
erations 6 (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf.
137. Letter from the Rt. Hon. Adam Ingram, MP, U.K. Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, to Adam Price MP (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Ingram Letter, Apr. 7, 2004].
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seems to have been taken by the U.K. Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. 38
Here, then, we again have two alternative bases for non-applicability, but
of a different character. The first basis is a variant on the territorial
argument put forward by the United States: that the ECHR only applies
in the territory of contracting States. This does not necessarily rule out
applicabily to a contracting State acting outside its territory (as the
United States argument does), so long as that State is acting in the
territory of another contracting State. The second basis focuses on the
degree of control exercised: Ingram seems to assume that a certain
degree of control, apparently over territory ("those parts of Iraq"), is
always required for the Convention to apply to the United Kingdom
extraterritorially and argues that this is not the case in Iraq.
We can see, then, that parallel to assertions and fears about the
inapplicability of certain areas of domestic law extraterritorially, but
given relatively less mainstream coverage, are assertions by the United
States and the United Kingdom as to such inapplicability in relation to
the main international human rights treaties on civil and political rights.
C. Suggestions that the Avoidance of Law is Intentional
Earlier we saw how some commentators question whether the use of
certain methods of interrogation once considered beyond the pale should
be revisited. Professor Alan Dershowitz, it will be recalled, argues that if
such methods are to be used, then this use should be legally sanctioned
so that it can operate under some kind of legal framework.'39 Such com-
138. The Foreign Secretary made the following statement in a Parliamentary Written
Answer to Sir Menzies Campbell MP on May 17, 2004: "[a]s the Government have said in
relation to the current High Court cases brought by the families of 13 Iraqi civilians, the
Government's position is that ECHR rights have no application in Iraq." HOUSE OF COMMONS
HANSARD, Vol. 421, Part No. 87, Columns 674W-675W (2004) (written answer of Jack Straw
MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to Sir Menzies Campell, MP),
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040517/text/
40517w06.htm#40517w06.html_sbhd3. In a later written answer to Sir Menzies, the Foreign
Secretary made the following statement in relation to the applicability of the ECHR to the
United Kingdom in Iraq, invoking by contrast the situation in Turkish-occupied northern Cy-
prus: "[t]he citizens of Iraq had no rights at all under the ECHR prior to military action by the
coalition forces; furthermore, the UK does not exercise the same degree of control over Iraq as
existed in relation to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus." European Convention on
Human Rights, HOUSE OF COMMONS HANSARD, Vol. 421, Part No. 89, Column No. 1083W
(2004) (written answer from Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs to Sir Menzies Campbell, MP), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm2003O4/cmhansrd/vo040519/text/40519w29.htm#40519w29.html_sbhd5 [hereinafter
Straw May 19, 2004]. The northern Cyprus situation and the European Court of Human
Rights cases arising out of it are discussed below in the text from note 182.
139. In a parallel development, there have been calls by President Bush and Prime Min-
ister Blair for those areas of international law regulating the basis for carrying out one
particular extraterritorial activity (as opposed to regulating what States can do when extraterri-
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ments, of course, presuppose that the law has not changed. As far as the
constraints of international human rights law are concerned, the prohibi-
tions on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment
remain as they were pre-9/1 1. Under the UN Torture Convention, which
in this respect reflects the position under the ICCPR and the ECHR,
"[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture."'
This legal situation, coupled with assertions about the non-
applicability of the law discussed above, has led some commentators to
speculate, or even assert, that the reason for the choice of the extraterri-
torial locus is bound up in the "extra-legal" character of this locus. Just
as it is speculated that States chose the extraterritorial location in part to
avoid public scrutiny, so too it is suggested that this choice was moti-
vated by a desire to avoid those areas of law that supposedly need
reforming but have not yet been changed, or at any rate to avoid legal
regulation. Johan Steyn asserts that "[t]he purpose of holding the
prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay was and is to put them beyond the rule of
torial activities are underway), the use of military force, to be interpreted differently and/or
altered to give States a broader entitlement to act. The National Security Strategy paper issued
by President Bush in 2002 states that:
[flor centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack
before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present
an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often condi-
tioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most
often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using con-
ventional means.
President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15
(Sept. 17, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc.nss.pdf. Discussing the use of such force
for humanitarian reasons without a UN Security Council mandate, U.K. Prime Minister Blair
argued in 2004 that:
[it] may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can
systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do,
when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the defi-
nition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves
already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a catastrophe).
This may be the law, but should it be?
Blair statement, Mar. 5, 2004, supra note 100, at 13. See also Tony Blair, Doctrine of the In-
ternational Community, Speech at the Economic Club, Chicago (Apr. 24, 1999), at
http://www.number- I0.gov.uk/output/Page 1297.asp.
140. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, New York, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2.2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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law, beyond the protection of any courts, and at the mercy of the vic-
tors."'4 '
In a similar vein, the Economist asserted that the Bush administra-
tion "has imprisoned some 680 people at Guantdnamo Bay precisely
because it believed that the naval base, held on a perpetual lease, is out-
side the reach of anyone's courts, including America's.'
' 42
In the Washington Post, Higham, Stephenson, and Williams assert
that, in addition to being relatively quiet and safe from attack,
Guantdnamo Bay was chosen over alternatives in the United States (a
military facility in Kansas and, incredibly, the former prison on Alcatraz
Island in San Francisco) because it was "beyond the reach of U.S.
courts.' 4 3 In the refugee context, it is also alleged that part of the motiva-
tion for choosing the extraterritorial locus is the perceived absence of a
comparable level of legal regulation.'"
As with their fears about the alleged practices being conducted,
commentators present a dual concern: the fear that the law is being
avoided in order that certain practices be conducted that would not be
lawful, and the worry that this sets a dangerous precedent in terms of the
behavior of other States.
But why does the avoidance of law matter? What value is there to
having extraterritorial action subject to legal regulation? Does the law
prevent States from being able to take necessary action? Alternatively,
does subjecting extraterritorial action to legal regulation merely provide
greater legitimacy to extraterritorial action without actually placing such
action under any meaningful constraint?
D. The Value and the Limits of the Law
One popular perception of human rights law obligations is that they
are somehow a series of absolute rights that can never be limited to pre-
serve public order. To invoke the phrase of Justice Jackson in the
Terminiello case, when public order is threatened in such circumstances,
this absolutist approach to rights renders the legal regime through which
it is pursued (in the case of Terminiello the U.S. Constitution) a "suicide
pact. ' ' 145 As Justice Jackson stated in Terminiello however, "[t]he choice
is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and an-
archy without either.'
'146
141. Steyn, supra note 113, at 8.
142. Unjust, Unwise, Un-American, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 9.
143. Higham et al., supra note 32.
144. See Amnesty International, June 2003, supra note 17, introduction, para. 1.
145. See the end of Justice Jackson's Dissenting Opinion in Terminiello v. City of Chi-




If one aspires to "liberty with order," the question is how to strike the
right balance between safeguarding human dignity on an individual level
and preserving order generally. Far from avoiding this question, interna-
tional human rights law actually seeks to provide a normative system,
notably with its limitation and derogation provisions, through which it-
can be addressed. As the U.K. Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, stated in
relation to the United Kingdom and its bill of rights, the Human Rights
Act:
There are pressures created by the need to protect this country
from merciless acts of international terrorists. These pressures
will test the [Human Rights Act]. But the Human Rights Act is
not a suicide pact! It does not require this country to tie its hands
behind its back in the face of aggression, terrorism or violent
crime.
147
When the life of the nation is at risk, the main treaties on civil and
political rights allow States to "derogate" from their obligations: to
withdraw from being bound by certain substantive rights guarantees on a
temporary basis to the extent that this is necessary to meet the excep-
tional threat.
Even in such circumstances, however, a valid derogation by a State
is not the same as the non-applicability of that State's human rights obli-
gations. In the first place, the State must make a formal declaration of
derogation. 4 1 In the words of the UN Human Rights Committee, this
"requirement is essential for the maintenance of the principles of legality
and rule of law at times when they are most needed.', 49 Moreover, only
those derogations necessary to meet the needs of the war or public emer-
gency, and proportionate to that need, are permissible. As the Human
Rights Committee stated in relation to the obligations under the ICCPR,
"even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant
are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat
to the life of the nation."' 5' Even if a broad series of derogations meet
147. Lord Chief Justice Woolf, Human Rights: Have the Public Benefited?, Speech at
the British Academy (Oct. 15, 2002), at http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/src/tob02/woolf.html.
148. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27(3), OAS Treaty
Series No. 36, [hereinafter ACHR]; ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 4(3); European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15(3), ETS
No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. See also HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT 29,
STATES OF EMERGENCY, art. 4, para. 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/REv.1/ADD.l 1 (2001) [herein-
after UN HRC GENERAL COMMENT 29].
149. UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148, para. 2.
150. ACHR, supra note 148, art. 27(1); ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 4(1); ECHR, supra
note 148, art. 15(1). See also UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148, paras. 3-6.
151. UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148, para. 3.
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this test, certain obligations are incapable of any derogation. Notably for
our purposes, these include the obligation not to commit torture and in-
human and degrading treatment and punishment, as reflected in the
provision from the Convention Against Torture extracted above, which is
echoed in the listing of torture as a non-derogable right in both the
ICCPR and the ECHR.12 Moreover, the UN Human Rights Committee
has stated that, "[tihe prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions
or unacknowledged detention are not subject to derogation," and are "ab-
solute ... even in times of emergency."' 53
Operating outside the application of human rights law, by contrast,
although allowing States to restrict rights, necessarily permits restric-
tions on an arbitrary basis. Even if some such restrictions might be
justified, a legal basis for judging this matter is absent. As a conse-
quence, States lose whatever legitimacy is associated with "lawfulness"
in respect of these restrictions. Thus Lord Woolf states that the U.K.
Human Rights Act reduces "the risk of our committing an 'own goal'. In
defending democracy, we must not forget the need to observe the values
which make democracy worth defending."'"
The concern, then, is that States responding to threats by groups
seeking to destroy the liberal, secular, rights-based political order that is
the underpinning of human rights law and attempting to foster the adop-
tion of such an order overseas-most notably in Iraq-might actually
undermine this order and their own promotion of it if they act outside an
arena of effective legal regulation. Johan Steyn remarks that "the type of
justice meted out at Guantdnamo Bay is likely to make martyrs of the
prisoners in the moderate Muslim world with whom the West must work
to ensure world peace and stability."' 55
As far as international human rights law is concerned, the signifi-
cance and value of the application of this law should not be overstated.
In the first place, this area of law is criticized for according too much
latitude to States during "emergency" situations because of the generous
interpretations of derogation provisions made by international review
mechanisms, especially the ECHR Strasbourg machinery with its invoca-
tion of a broad "margin of appreciation" involving deference to States'
own decisions as to the existence of an "emergency" situation and the
necessity and proportionality of restrictions introduced to respond to this
152. ACHR, supra note 148, art. 27(2); ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 4(2); ECHR, supra
note 148, art. 15(2). See also UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148, para. 7.
153. UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148, para. 13(b).
154. Woolf, supra note 147.
155. Steyn, supra note 113, at 14.
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threat.116 One might ask, then, whether the inadequate nature of the test
applied to state action renders this area of the law incapable of delivering
what it promises, thereby serving ironically to legitimate state infringe-
ments on individual rights without having actually placed States under
any meaningful constraint.
Alongside concerns relating to the substantive content of interna-
tional human rights law are other worries relating to the value of this
regime of law as an effective review mechanism, notably relating to en-
forcement. Whereas the European Court of Human Rights exercises
jurisdiction to hear complaints from individuals against all Council of
Europe States, 57 many of whom engaged in the extraterritorial activities
discussed in this paper, the Human Rights Committee's (somewhat)
equivalent jurisdiction of issuing Views on individual communications
does not operate with respect to the United States or the United King-
dom.'58 And even when some form of enforcement mechanism does
exist, for example the reporting procedure to the Human Rights Commit-
tee under the ICCPR,'59 the problems identified earlier concerning the
limited remit of country-specific NGOs can mean that the crucial role
that NGOs play in the operation of human rights mechanisms is lacking
when it comes to extraterritorial activity. For example, one critic of the
U.K.'s actions in Jersey, one of the Channel Islands, a U.K. Crown De-
pendency, complains that:
Typically, in Jersey there are no NGO groups and even though
some individuals may be members of UK based NGO's (like
Justice, Interights, Liberty) these organisations have no capacity
or knowledge to assist with the Dependencies' reports or to
156. The following are some of the key cases under the European Convention system:
Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260; Brannigan & McBride v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1993);
Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1988); Ire-
land v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1978); Cyprus v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1976)
[hereinafter Cyprus v. Turkey 1976]; Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v. Greece,
App. Nos. 3321/67; 3322/67; 3323/67; 3344/67, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R. 1969); Lawless v Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1961). See also D.J. HARRIS ET
AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. 16 (1995) [hereinafter
HARRIS ET AL.]. For commentary on the nature of the latitude given to states under derogation
provisions, see, for example, Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations under Human Rights Treaties, 48
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1976-77); Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Dero-
gation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 69 (1995).
157. See ECHR, supra note 148, art. 34
158. Because neither State has ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allowing
for this. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR First Optional
Protocol].
159. See ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 40.
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advise at length. Individuals in more distant and isolated places
will experience even more difficulties. Thus the Reporting Proc-
ess is rendered largely meaningless."6
Beyond these and other problems with the law, it must also be re-
called that the nature of the activities under evaluation means that many
of them take place in conditions of near total secrecy. As the Economist
newspaper asked: "[i]s the American government torturing terrorist sus-
pects or not?... American officials claim to have detained thousands of
suspects, including some senior al-Qaeda leaders, but will not say where,
and under what conditions, they are being held."161 The ICRC has stated
that it:
has also repeatedly appealed to the American authorities for ac-
cess to people detained in undisclosed locations.
I[... I
Beyond Bagram and Guantdnamo Bay, the ICRC is increasingly
concerned about the fate of an unknown number of people cap-
tured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in
undisclosed locations. For the ICRC, obtaining information on
these detainees and access to them is an important humanitarian
priority.'
62
Whatever the truth, then, of the "legal black hole" designations, it is
certainly true that many of the extraterritorial activities conducted since
9/11 have taken place in circumstances where the opportunities for scru-
tiny by third parties are markedly constrained and sometimes virtually
absent. Even allowing for their own limitations, then, initiatives to insist
on the applicability of the law, from academic writing to the submission
of amicus briefs before the courts, are no substitute for the more com-
plex and broad-ranging business of transforming the political culture
both nationally and internationally in order to create greater transparency
and accountability in relation to state actions overseas.
In the light of these concerns, one should not be too sanguine as to
the value of international human rights law to provide meaningful and
effective review of extraterritorial state action. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that one should assume that the applicability of interna-
tional human rights law to such action would have no value. Even
160. United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report:
Human Rights Report 2001, Appendix to the Minutes of Evidence, Memorandum from Mi-
chael Dun, The State of Human Rights in Jersey, HC589, para. 15 (2001), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200lO2/cmselect/cmfaff/589/589ap02.htm.
161. The Pledge, supra note 60, at 47.
162. ICRC Statement, May 14, 2004, supra note 101.
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allowing for concerns about the derogation test, for example, at a bare
minimum the law here still provides an absolute prohibition on breaches
of non-derogable rights such as the right to be free from torture. It is also
significant that, as mentioned earlier, the United States and the United
Kingdom seek to deny the applicability of the main international treaties
on civil and political rights: this would surely be unnecessary if the two
States considered the substantive content of these instruments or their
modes of enforcement to place them under no meaningful constraint.
Because of this, a consideration of the applicability of international hu-
man rights law is a valid response to the need for greater scrutiny of
extraterritorial action, provided, of course, that as such it is understood
to be but one part of the broader initiative, discussed earlier, required to
bring greater critical attention to and scrutiny of such activity.
V. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ICCPR AND ECHR
A. Revisiting the U.S. and U.K. Claims
As previously mentioned, all areas of international human rights law
are potentially relevant to extraterritorial action. A full consideration of
this corpus of law, however, is beyond the scope of a piece of this
length. 63 Instead, the focus here will be on the two treaties-the ICCPR
and the ECHR-which the United Kingdom and, as far as the ICCPR is
concerned, the United States have asserted to be inapplicable to some or
all of their extraterritorial activities. Are the two States right in the asser-
tions they make; are the activities discussed above conducted in a legal
vacuum as far as these treaties are concerned?
The following answer to this question is divided into two parts based
on the two U.S. reasons for rejecting the applicability of the ICCPR out-
lined earlier: (1) the "wartime" context in which some, but not all, of the
extraterritorial activities take place; and (2) the extraterritorial location
itself. 6' The analysis in the second part will require a consideration of
the two U.K. arguments on extraterritorial applicability; the potential
163. See, e.g., Coomans & Kamminga, supra note 133.
164. There are other potential reasons why states might consider international human
rights law not to apply extraterritorially. These include situations where the acts in question
are not imputable to them but to a separate juridical entity, for example on the grounds that the
entity performing the acts has been "placed at the disposal of' a third State for the purposes of
the acts in question. On this, see, for example, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 240
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1992); Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session (23 April-I
June and 20 July-lO August 2001), U.N. GAOR, 56th sess., Supp. No. 10, Art. 6, at 95-98,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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limitation of the ECHR to actions taken within the territory of contract-
ing states, and the meaning and relevance of the "effective control" test.
It was illustrated above that in the "war on terror" context allegations
of extraterritorial detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects by U.S.
authorities have been accompanied by allegations of rendering such sus-
pects to third States. When the detention and interrogation in such
circumstances is carried out without any U.S. involvement, we are not in
the arena of an extraterritorial act committed by the State concerned, the
focus of this Article. The act of rendering is regulated, in circumstances
where due process guarantees are somehow defective or it is foreseeable
that the individual will face human rights violations in the third State, by
the area of international human rights law concerned with state action
within the jurisdiction which has an effect on the enjoyment of rights
outside this jurisdiction.
This separate area of law is beyond the scope of the present study; 65
the general approach to it in international human rights law is illustrated
in the following passage in the Soering decision of the European Court
of Human Rights in 1989, discussing the obligations under Article 3 of
the ECHR:
165. See CAT, supra note 140, art. 3; T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, 2000-
Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 435; D. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30240/96, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777;
H.L.R. v. France, App. No. 24573/94, 1997-I11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 745; M.A.R. v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 28038/95, Eur. Comm'n H.R., Admissibility Decision of Jan. 16, 1997; Chahal v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831; Adegbie v. Austria, App.
No. 26998/95, Eur. Comm'n H.R., Admissibility Decision, April 9, 1996; Aylor-Davis v.
France, App. No. 22742/93, 76-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 164 (1994); Vilvarajah v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, 215 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1991); Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, 201 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1991); Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 1 (1989); Hadl Boudellaa, Boumediene Lakhdar, Mohamed Nechle and Saber
Lahmar v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cases Nos.
CH/20/8679, CH/02/8689, CH/02/8690 and CH/02/8691, Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits, Nov. 11, 2002, available at
http://www.hrc.ba (hereinafter Bosnia expulsion cases). See also General Comment on the
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, Committee
Against Torture, 53d Sess., Annex IX, Supp. No. 44, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/53/44; General
Comment No. 20(44), Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., art. 7, para. 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.3 (1992); General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of the Covenant: The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 80th Sess., 2187th mtg., para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (2004) [here-
inafter HRC General Comment 31]; Richard Plender & Nuala Mole, Beyond the Geneva
Convention: Constructing a de facto Right of Asylum from International Human Rights In-
struments, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND
REGIMES 81 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds.,1999); Brian Gorlick, The Conven-
tion and the Committee against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime for Refiugees,
11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 479 (1999).
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It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the
Convention ... were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender
a fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extra-
dition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in
the brief and general wording of Article 3 ... would plainly be
contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the
Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite also ex-
tends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the
receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article. . . 6
It is notable that a human rights body-the partly internationalized
Human Rights Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina' 67-- determined in
2002 that the transfer from that country to Guantinamo Bay of four ter-
rorist suspects breached Article 1 of Protocol 6 to the European
Convention on Human Rights, the instrument prohibiting the use of the
death penalty,1 68 because of a failure to seek assurances from the United
States prior to the handover that the death penalty would not be imposed
on the individuals concerned.
69
B. Do International Treaties on Civil and
Political Rights Apply in Wartime?
We begin our consideration of the extraterritorial applicability of the
ICCPR and ECHR with the question of the relevance of the "wartime"
situation in which some of the extraterritorial activities are carried out. It
might be thought that humanitarian law on the one hand and human
rights law on the other are mutually exclusive in terms of the situations
in which they apply. When one area of law is in play, the other is not,
and vice versa. Humanitarian law applies only in times of "war;" human
rights law applies only in times of "peace." Whereas the first contention
is correct, the second runs counter to a basic understanding of human
166. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 88.
167. Agreement on Human Rights, Dec. 14, 1995, Rep. Bosn. & Herz.-Fed. Bosn.&
Herz.-Republika Srpkska, Annex 6 and Appendix, 35 I.L.M. 75, 133 [hereinafter GFA Annex
6]. On international appointments to public institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, for
example, Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East imor and Beyond: The Role of International
TerritorialAdministration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (2001).
168. See ECHR, supra note 148; Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 28,1983, E.T.S. No. 114 [here-
inafter ECHR Protocol 6]. The Convention and its Protocols are part of the law of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its two constituent entities by way of GFA Annex 6, supra note 167, art. I,
item 14, Appendix.
169. Bosnia expulsion cases, supra note 65, para. 300
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rights law.'7° In the Coard case of 1999, concerning the detention of an
individual by U.S. military forces during the 1983 U.S. invasion of Gre-
nada,"7' the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights made the
following statement about international human rights law generally,
rather than the ICCPR in particular:
[W]hile international humanitarian law pertains primarily in
times of war and the international law of human rights applies
most fully in times of peace, the potential application of one
does not necessarily exclude or displace the other. There is an
integral linkage between the law of human rights and humanitar-
ian law because they share a "common nucleus of non-derogable
rights and a common purpose of protecting human life and dig-
nity," and there may be a substantial overlap in the application of
these bodies of law. Certain core guarantees apply in all circum-
stances, including situations of conflict ... Both normative
systems may thus be applicable to the situation under study. '
The applicability of international treaty law on civil and political
rights in times of war is assumed by the aforementioned derogation pro-
visions of human rights instruments. '73 It follows, then, that in all
170. On the relationship between humanitarian law and international human rights law,
see, for example, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8)
hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Coard v. United States of America, Case
10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283 OEA/ser.IJV/II.106, doc.3rev. (1999) [hereinafter Coard];
Salas and Others v. United States of America, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 312,
OEA/ser.LIV/II.85, doc.9rev. (1993), reprinted in 123 I.L.R. 1; RENE PROVOST, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW-THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY (Daniel Warner ed., 1997). See also
Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993); Jochen Abr. Frowein, The Relationship Between
Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 1998 IsR. Y.B. OF HUM. RTS.
1; Francoise Hampson, Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the Interna-
tional Law of Armed Conflicts, XXXI REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE 119 (1992); 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Human
Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 324 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1 (1998).
171. For the background to the case, see Coard, supra note 170, paras. 1-4.
172. Id. para. 39 (footnotes omitted).
173. See ACHR, supra note 148, art. 27; ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 4; ECHR, supra
note 148, art. 15. On this area of the law, see, for example, Aksoy, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.;
Brannigan, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Brogan, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A); Ireland Case, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Cyprus v. Turkey 1976, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.; Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on
H.R.; Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Series A, No. 9
(1987); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Series A, No. 8
(1987); Jorge Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (1981); UN HRC General Comment 29, supra note 148,
art. 4; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 156; Higgins, supra note 156; Marks, supra note 156.
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circumstances, both wartime and peacetime, there will always be a core
set of human rights obligations in play, operating in tandem with the ob-
ligations under humanitarian law. As the International Court of Justice
stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in relation to the
ICCPR, "the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Politi-
cal Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article
4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in
a time of national emergency.',14 Thus the UN Human Rights Committee
stated:
[T]he Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to
which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable.
While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules
of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for
the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.'
It is notable that none of these statements make a distinction, as the U.S.
memo extracted above does, between international and non-
international armed conflict.
It might be asserted that human rights law has no place in a wartime
situation. In such a situation, different considerations prevail and to con-
sider the niceties of human rights one would respect in peacetime is to
misunderstand the needs of the battlefield. In part, this is an argument
for total war-that no standards should operate on the battlefield at all.
Such an approach would do away with much of the laws of war. If, how-
ever, one accepts the premise of humanitarian law-that military
necessity must sometimes be trumped by certain basic standards-then
this particular objection to human rights law falls away. The question
then becomes whether the restrictions placed on the State during war-
time by human rights law strike the correct balance between the need to
preserve order and the need to safeguard human dignity. If one examines
the law in this area, as discussed above, one sees, if anything, a some-
what generous latitude accorded to States when the derogation
provisions of human rights treaties are interpreted.
174. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinon, 1996 I.C.J., para. 25.
175." HRC General Comment 31, supra note 165, para 11. In its earlier General Com-
ment 29, the Human Rights Committee made the following remark: "[d]uring armed conflict,
whether international or non-international, rules of international humanitarian law become
applicable and help, in addition to the provisions in article 4 and article 5, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant, to prevent the abuse of a State's emergency powers." HRC General Comment 29,
supra note 148, para. 3.
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C. Do the ICCPR and the ECHR Apply to
Extraterritorial State Action?
If the applicability of international treaties on civil and political
rights is not somehow excluded by the wartime context in which some of
the activities discussed in our study take place, is it excluded because
these activities occur extraterritorially, as the U.S. memo suggests? I will
now consider this second question in relation to the ICCPR and ECHR,
beginning with comments from international human rights law scrutiny
bodies interpreting these and other relevant legal instruments echoing
some of the concerns raised by commentators earlier about the problem
of extraterritorial activities operating "beyond the law."'76
1. Justifying Extraterritorial Applicability
In the Lopez Burgos and Celiberti de Casariego communications
concerning alleged abduction and detention by Uruguayan agents out-
side Uruguayan soil-in Brazil and Argentina respectively-and forced
transportation to Uruguay, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that
the "jurisdiction" test for the applicability of the ICCPR in Article 2
"does not imply that the State ... cannot be held accountable for viola-
tions of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the
territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Govern-
ment of that State or in opposition to it.' 77 The reason for this is the
provision in Article 5(1) of the Covenant, which states:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. 178
The Human Rights Committee concluded that "[i]n line with this, it
would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2
of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not
perpetrate on its own territory.'
79
176. For other academic commentary on the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR
and ECHR, see, for example, the relevant chapters of Coomans & Kamminga, supra note 133,
and sources cited therein.
177. Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, Hum. Rgts.
Comm., Supp. No. 40, at 176, para. 12.3, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981); Lilian Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. R. 13/56, Hum. Rgts. Comm., Supp No. 40, at 185,
para. 10.3, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).




Here, the Committee offers a principled basis for conceiving human
rights obligations extraterritorially: it would be "unconscionable" if a
double standard, whereby activities legally prohibited when committed
within the State's territory but not legally prohibited if committed extra-
territorially, subsisted merely by virtue of the extraterritorial locus. If
this were the case, States would be able to evade legal responsibility
simply by shifting their activities overseas, as is alleged to be the motiva-
tion for some of the extraterritorial acts discussed above.
In the Coard case mentioned earlier, when considering the extraterri-
torial applicability of human rights law, the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights stated that "[g]iven that individual rights inhere simply
by virtue of a person's humanity, each American State is obliged to up-
hold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction.""
In its General Comment 31, on Article 2 of the ICCPR, the UN Hu-
man Rights Committee invokes its earlier observations in General
Comment 15 that Covenant obligations operate with respect to "all indi-
viduals, regardless of nationality or statelessness" when discussing the
extraterritorial scope of the meaning of "jurisdiction" under Article
2.1181
Clearly, these comments affirm that the general principle that human
rights obligations are owed to all individuals, regardless of their nation-
ality, applies not only to a State's action within its territory, but also to
extraterritorial action. The context in which these comments are made-
in passages concerned with the idea of extraterritorial application of hu-
man rights law itself-perhaps suggests, however, that they also speak to
a general policy consideration that the non-nationality basis for conceiv-
ing human rights protection is relevant when considering whether human
rights law should apply extraterritorially.
Given that the majority of individuals affected by territorial state ac-
tion are a State's own nationals, and the majority of such individuals
affected by extraterritorial state action are aliens, to conceive "jurisdic-
tion" only territorially, even in circumstances where a State takes
extraterritorial action, would, in effect, produce a distinction in
protection as between nationals and aliens. Since this distinction is
adopted on the basis of a consideration-the enjoyment or lack of terri-
torial sovereignty-that, in terms of whether or not state action impacts
on the rights of individuals, is irrelevant, the unequal treatment it pro-
duces as between nationals and foreigners is of an arbitrary nature. As
such, it runs counter to the general concept of human rights based on
humanity rather than nationality. It might be said, then, that this concept
180. Coard, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., para. 37.
181. HRC General Comment 31, supra note 165, para. 10.
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requires extraterritorial activities to be brought within the frame of hu-
man rights obligations to avoid an arbitrary distinction in the application
of such obligations as between nationals and foreigners from subsisting.
Our next general principle comes from the Cyprus v. Turkey case'82
concerning Turkey's responsibility for the situation in northern Cyprus,
which Turkey invaded and occupied in 1984 following the proclamation
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in November
1983. '83 In its judgment the European Court of Human Rights made a
statement on some of the matters of principle at stake in extraterritorial
state actions of this kind:
[T]he Court must have regard to the special character of the
Convention as an instrument of European public order ... for
the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set
out in Article 19 of the Convention, "to ensure the observance of
the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Par-
ties".... Having regard to the applicant Government's
continuing inability to exercise their Convention obligations in
northern Cyprus, any other finding would result in a regrettable
vacuum in the system of human-rights protection in the territory
in question by removing from individuals there the benefit of the
Convention's fundamental safeguards and their right to call a
High Contracting Party to account for violation of their rights in
proceedings before the Court."4
In the later Bankovi6 case, which concerned the bombing of one of
the main buildings of Radio Televizije Srbije (RTS) in Belgrade by a
NATO aircraft during the 1999 bombing campaign of the then Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro), which at that time
was not a party to the ECHR,'85 the Court made the following statement
on the issues implicated by its earlier dictum in Cyprus v. Turkey:
It is true that, in its above-cited Cyprus v. Turkey judgment ...
the Court was conscious of the need to avoid "a regrettable vac-
uum in the system of human-rights protection" in northern
Cyprus. However ... that comment related to an entirely differ-
ent situation to the present: the inhabitants of northern Cyprus
182. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Judgment of the
Grand Chamber) [hereinafter Cyprus v. Turkey 2001].
183. See the explanation of the facts in id.; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 1995
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 310 (Judgment of the Grand Chamber, preliminary objections).
184. Cyprus v. Turkey 2001, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 78.
185. Bankovid v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, paras. 9-11




would have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the
Convention safeguards and system which they had previously
enjoyed, by Turkey's "effective control" of the territory and by
the accompanying inability of the Cypriot Government, as a
Contracting State, to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken un-
der the Convention.
... the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating, subject to
Article 56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context
and notably in the legal space (espacejuridique) of the Contract-
ing States. The FRY clearly does not fall within this legal space.
The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the
world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. Ac-
cordingly, the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human
rights' protection has so far been relied on by the Court in favour
of establishing jurisdiction only when the territory in question
was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would normally
be covered by the Convention.
86
Whereas the final sentence is an accurate description of the particu-
lar type of vacuum in rights protection at issue in the Cyprus v. Turkey
case, it must be asked whether the Court is suggesting here that these
particular circumstances are the only type of vacuum in rights protection
that would validly give rise to a need for extraterritorial obligations to
subsist.
The suggestion would be as follows: the only type of vacuum in
rights protection caused by extraterritorial state action that should be
remedied through the application of rights obligations in a particular
treaty to the State taking the action is action that: (1) occurs in the terri-
tory of another party to the same treaty; and (2) prevents the second
State from fulfilling its obligations under that treaty. Put differently, the
vacuum has to be caused by another State party to the treaty not being
able to fulfill its obligations under the treaty, rather than the broader no-
tion of any State (whether or not a party to that particular instrument)
being prevented from implementing its legal human rights obligations
(whether under that particular instrument, or under other areas of inter-
national law, and/or domestic law).
This suggestion would seem to depend on an assumption that the
only valid concern within human rights instruments about a vacuum in
rights protection created by extraterritorial state action relates to obliga-
tions owed by another state party. How might such an assumption be
sustained? One basis is suggested by the Court's comments in Bankovi6
186. Id. para 80.
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relating to the "espace juridique." It might be said that a broader ap-
proach also taking in action preventing non-parties from securing rights
would contradict a separate policy proscription: that regional human
rights treaties-and perhaps all human rights treaties-are only intended
to secure rights to individuals within the territories of states parties. Put
differently, not only is the treaty binding only on States party to it; also,
only individuals residing within the territory of all these parties-the
"legal space" of the treaty-can be rights holders under the instrument.
Because the application of the treaty is limited to this "legal space," it
follows that the treaty can only be concerned with remedying a vacuum
in rights protection if the vacuum relates to the obligations of a State
whose territory forms part of this legal space.
This "legal space" idea is, of course, germane for our analysis not
only because of its potential effect on the "vacuum" policy concern, but
also because in a broader way it would serve as a block on the applica-
tion of human rights treaties to extraterritorial state actions taking place
outside the legal space of these treaties. If correct, this general idea
would mean that a particular action taken by one State in the territory of
another State would take place in a "legal black hole" as far as the hu-
man rights obligations owed by the first State under a treaty, if the
second State was not also a party to that treaty. It is this potential that is
being exploited by the United Kingdom in relation to the application of
the ECHR in Iraq. It will be recalled that the U.K. Armed Forces Minis-
ter Ingram wrote in the following terms:
The European Convention on Human Rights is intended to apply
in a regional context in the legal space of the Contracting States.
It was not designed to be applied throughout the world and was
not intended to cover the activities of a signatory [sic] in a coun-
try which is not signatory [sic] to the Convention. The ECHR
can have no application to the activities of the UK in Iraq be-
cause the citizens of Iraq had no rights under the ECHR prior to
the military action by the Coalition Forces.'87
Although the minister's remark about the "design" of the ECHR
echoes the phrase used by the Court in the Bankovi6 judgment, his re-
mark that the ECHR was not "intended" to cover the activities of a state
party in the territory of a non-state party finds no echo in that judgment.
Rather, the Court states that the ECHR operates "essentially in a regional
context"-the word "context" is hardly a clear reference to a territorial
area (it could equally refer to a regional grouping of States, irrespective
of where they act)-and "notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of
187. Ingram Letter, Apr. 7, 2004, supra note 137.
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the Contracting states"-a clear reference to a territorial area, but not
one, because of the word "notably:' that necessarily means that the Con-
vention applies only in this area. Despite Ingram's unequivocal assertion,
neither of these remarks in Bankovi necessarily exclude the application
of the ECHR to the activities of Member States outside the territory of
the Council of Europe.
But what of the Court's comment in Bankovi6 that "[tihe Convention
was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of
the conduct of Contracting States"? Even if the other remarks in that
passage are not helpful either way, does this not suggest a general ap-
proach in favor of Ingram's assertion? Such a comment could indeed
mean that, in all circumstances, the ECHR does not apply to the actions
of convention parties outside the legal space of Council of Europe mem-
ber states. The problem, however, is that this is contradicted by the case
law of the Court. In the Ocalan case, the Court held that the actions of
Turkish agents in relation to the alleged abduction of Abdullah Ocalan in
Kenya-not a Convention State-took place within Turkish "jurisdic-
tion."' 8 Similarly, the Court declared admissible the Issa case brought
against Turkey in relation to its actions in northern Iraq89 and at the
merits stage affirmed that had there been a sufficient factual basis for the
Turkish presence in the area in question-something the court concluded
there was not-then the alleged victims would have come within Tur-
key's "jurisdiction" for the purposes of the Convention.'°
How do we reconcile these cases with the Court's comment about
the limited "design" of the ECHR in Bankovi? We might dismiss the
Bankovi6 language as dicta-the Court had already reached a conclusion
that rendered the case inadmissible, having determined that the nature of
the air strikes by NATO states in the FRY did not render this territory
under the jurisdiction of the States involved as far as the exercise of ef-
fective control was concerned.' 9' Furthermore, we might emphasise the
fact that the Court's dictum refers to what the convention "was ... de-
signed" for. This could be understood as a reference to the original intent
of the framers, without prejudice to the question of whether this original
intent is determinative more than fifty years after the ECHR was signed.
The contention that a subsequent position at odds with this original "de-
sign" might be possible is then reinforced by the consistent willingness
188. Ocalan (Merits), supra note 4. For discussion of the case, see infra text correspond-
ing to notes 210-211.
189. Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., Chamber, Admissibil-
ity Decision (May 30, 2000).
190. Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., Merits Decision (Nov.
16, 2004).
191. Bankovi6, 200 1-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 75. See also id. paras. 76-77.
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of the Strasbourg institutions to interpret the convention as a "living in-
strument."1 2 If we then recall the other cases where the Court has found
the convention applicable to Member States' actions outside the legal
space of the Council of Europe, we must conclude that, contrary to the
statement of Adam Ingram, the Convention is so applicable.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's invocation of the "legal space"
concept in Bankovi6 is best interpreted as a limited response to a concern
about the particular type of vacuum in rights protection-preventing an-
other state party from securing rights under the Convention-that it
chose to emphasize, rather than a general statement of principle about
the spatial application of the ECHR. Because it is so limited, it should
not be taken as a suggestion that this is the only type of vacuum that
should give rise to the extraterritorial application of human rights; rather,
it is simply the type of vacuum that, in the words of the Court in Bank-
ovi6, "has so far been relied on by the Court" in this regard. The juridical
significance of the Court's comments on the legal space, then, is limited
to refuting a concern about a particular type of vacuum in rights protec-
tion, without prejudice to the broader questions of whether this is the
only type of vacuum that might give rise to a need for the extraterritorial
application of human rights treaties and whether individuals outside the
legal space of these treaties can have rights under them with respect to
states parties.
The Court's comments in Bankovi6 do not exclude the notion that
the language in the Cyprus v. Turkey case speaks to a more general pol-
icy objective, applicable to any human rights treaty, that action by a State
outside its national territory (whether or not the sovereign in that terri-
tory is bound by the same human rights instrument) should not be
allowed to create a "vacuum" in legal human rights protection generally
by preventing the existing sovereign from safeguarding legal rights in the
territory concerned, whether or not that second State is obliged to safe-
guard these legal rights under the particular human rights instrument at
issue. The invocation of this concern in the context of one State's obliga-
tions under a particular human rights treaty in circumstances where the
obligations are also owed by the other State involved under the same
treaty should not be taken to suggest that this is the only context in
which this concern is relevant.
In concluding this consideration of the general policy issues high-
lighted by these cases, the cases suggest that human rights law should
apply to extraterritorial state action in order to prevent the following out-
192. Loizidou, 1995 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 71; Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
para. 101; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, para. 31 (1978). See also
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 156, at 7-9.
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comes from occurring in consequence of the extraterritorial nature of the
action: (1) a double standard of legality operating as between the territo-
rial and extraterritorial locus (Lopez Burgos and Celiberti de Casariego);
(2) a disparity in human rights protection operating on grounds of na-
tionality (Coard and General Comment 31); (3) a vacuum in rights
protection being created through the act of preventing the existing sover-
eign from safeguarding rights (Cyprus v. Turkey).
The point is not that these three outcomes are necessarily unjustified
in all circumstances (though they might be), but, rather, that they should
not subsist merely because of the extraterritorial locus in which the acts
take place. It is this situation which is avoided through the application of
human rights obligations to extraterritorial state actions.
An alternative approach, seemingly adopted by the European Com-
mission of Human Rights in the Hess case of 1975, concerning U.K.
responsibility for the Allied detention of Rudolph Hess at Spandau
Prison in Berlin, is to approach the issue not in terms of identifying rea-
sons why human rights law should apply extraterritorially, but, rather, by
considering whether there are any persuasive reasons against this posi-
tion. The Commission concluded in the negative: "there is in principle,
from a legal point of view, no reason why acts of the British authorities
in Berlin should not entail the liability of the United Kingdom under the
Convention."1
93
Whether considering the issue from a default position of non-
applicability or applicability, bodies representing three leading interna-
tional judicial or quasi-judicial institutions monitoring the application of
international legal instruments on civil and political rights-the Human
Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission, and the European
Court and Commission of Human Rights-all conclude that as a matter
of principle this area of international human rights law should apply
extraterritorially. How, then, is this general principle realized in the rele-
vant legal rules? 94
2. The Concept of "Jurisdiction"
The ICCPR and the ECHR do not conceive state responsibility sim-
ply in terms of the acts of parties, as is the case, for example, in Article 1
of the third Geneva Convention (on the treatment of prisoners of war), in
which contracting parties undertake "to respect and to ensure respect for
193. Ilse Hess v United Kingdom, App. No. 6231/73, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
72, 73 (1975).
194. The remainder of this section is limited to the extraterritorial application of interna-
tional treaties on civil and political rights. There is the separate question of the extraterritorial
application of customary international law on civil and political rights, which may not be
subject to a jurisdictional limitation.
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the present Convention in all circumstances."' 9 Instead, responsibility is
conceived in a particular context: the State's jurisdiction. A State is
obliged not merely to secure the rights contained in the treaty but to do
so within its "jurisdiction."'' 96 Thus a nexus to the State-termed jurisdic-
tion-has to be established before the state act or omission can give rise
to responsibility.
The consistent jurisprudence of the relevant international review
mechanisms has been to interpret jurisdiction as operating extraterritori-
ally in certain circumstances. The second basis for rejecting the
application of the ICCPR offered by the U.S. Defense Department
memorandum is, therefore, incorrect.' 97 The key question is the precise
circumstances in which jurisdiction operates extraterritorially. This ques-
tion needs to be answered in order to know whether the United
Kingdom's second basis for rejecting the application of the ECHR to its
actions in Iraq-that it doesn't exercise the necessary degree of territo-
rial control-is sustainable.
The term "jurisdiction" has been understood in the extraterritorial
context in terms of the existence of a connection between the State, on
the one hand, and either the territory in which the relevant acts took
place-a spatial connection--or the individual affected by them-a per-
sonal connection. We shall consider each type of connection in turn.
3. "Jurisdiction" Conceived Spatially
Beginning with the approach that conceives the target of the rela-
tionship spatially, here exercising "jurisdiction" amounts to asserting
control over a particular territorial space, within which the State is
obliged to secure individual rights in a generalized sense. Such a gener-
alized approach can be understood as an analogue to the approach taken
to the State's obligations in its own territory, and arguably reflects a gen-
eral international law norm of liability based on the exercise of control
over non-sovereign territory. This principle was articulated in the Inter-
195. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
196. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 2; ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note
158, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; ECHR, supra note 148, art. 1. Some obligations
are limited to the State's territory, see, for example, Protocol No. 4 to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, art. 3,
ETS No. 46.
197. Some human rights treaties include a special clause allowing for the application of
the rights they contain to be extended to dependent territories. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note
148, art. 56. Whether such rights can also apply because of the extraterritorial exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the State concerned is beyond the scope of this Article; this question is po-
tentially mediated by the agency issue discussed supra note 164.
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national Court of Justice's 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, in which
the Court stated that South Africa was:
[A]ccountable for any violations ... of the rights of the people
of Namibia. The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to
administer the Territory does not release it from its obligations
and responsibilities under international law towards other States
in respect of the exercise of its powers in relation to this Terri-
tory. Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or
legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting
other States.
98
The spatial approach to the target involved in the jurisdiction con-
cept was articulated in the Loizidou, Cyprus v. Turkey, and Bankovi6
cases before the European Court of Human Rights.
Like the Cyprus v. Turkey case discussed above, the Loizidou case
concerned the question of Turkey's responsibility for certain aspects of
the situation in northern Cyprus. In its 1995 judgment on preliminary
objections in Loizidou, affirmed in its judgment on the merits, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights stated that:
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may ... arise when
as a consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlaw-
ful-it exercises effective control of an area outside its national
territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such
control .... 99
In its judgment on the merits, the Court stated that:
It is not necessary to determine whether... Turkey actually ex-
ercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the
authorities of the "TRNC". It is obvious from the large number
of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus... that her
army exercises effective overall control over that part of the is-
land. Such control, according to the relevant test and in the
circumstances of the case, entails her responsibility for the poli-
cies and actions of the "TRNC" ... Those affected by such
policies or actions therefore come within the "jurisdiction" of
Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ... Her
198. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, para. 118.
199. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, para. 52 (De-
cision on the Merits, quoting Loizidou, 1995 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser A), para. 62).
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obligation to secure to the applicant the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention therefore extends to the northern part of
Cyprus.200
In general, then, the test is "effective control" over territory; the exis-
tence of this factual situation gives rise to a responsibility to secure the
rights within the ECHR in the territory concerned. On the facts in North-
ern Cyprus, the Court emphasized that Turkey exercised effective control
operating "overall;" in such circumstances, it was unnecessary to iden-
tify whether the exercise of control was detailed. Thus, if a State is in
overall control of a territorial unit, everything within that unit falls
within its "jurisdiction," even if at lesser levels power is exercised by
other actors (e.g. if particular activities are devolved to other states or
local actors). In the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment, the European Court of
Human Rights stated:
Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus ... [Tur-
key's] responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own
soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be engaged
by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives
by virtue of Turkish military and other support. It follows that, in
terms of Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey's "jurisdiction"
must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of sub-
stantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional
Protocols which she has ratified, and that violations of those
rights are imputable to Turkey.20'
In the aforementioned Bankovi6 case, the Court made the following
general statement on the issue of effective control:
[T]he case-law of the Court demonstrates that its recognition of
the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting
State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State,
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its in-
habitants abroad, as a consequence of military occupation or
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Govern-
ment of that territory exercises all or some of the public powers
normally to be exercised by that Government.202
If we recall the backdrop to the Northern Cyprus cases, we see the
Court in Bankovik emphasizing a further feature of those cases which
was not actually emphasized in the Court's consideration of the exercise
200. Id. para. 56. See also Loizidou, 1995 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 63--64.
201. Cyprus v. Turkey 2001, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 77.
202. Bankovid, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 71.
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of jurisdiction in them. For the Court in Bankovi6, the issue is control
over territory that is not only "effective" but also involves the exercise of
"some or all of the public powers normally to be exercised" by the local
government. Whereas indeed such powers were exercised by Turkey in
northern Cyprus, their exercise was not seen as a prerequisite to the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction by the Court in the northern Cyprus cases: the only
issue was the exercise of "effective control." The statement in Bankovie,
then, should be taken in a somewhat loose sense as a general description
of the factual circumstances in which the Court had previously found the
exercise of jurisdiction ("it has done so"), rather than as either an accu-
rate statement of the salient facts in those previous cases, or, indeed, a
statement of the key factual elements that must subsist in order for extra-
territorial jurisdiction to subsist under the "effective control" heading. It
is notable in this regard that in its application of the law to the facts of
the case, the Court made no statement, either explicit or implicit, touch-
ing on the question of whether or not the relevant acts-the bombing-
involved the exercise of powers normally to be exercised by the local
government.203
The test, then, is "effective control" over territory. It will be recalled
that the U.K. Defense Minister Ingram argued that "it does not follow
that the UK exercises the degree of control that is necessary to bring
those parts of Iraq within the UK's jurisdiction for the purposes of article
1 of the Convention."2° The U.K. Foreign Secretary stated that "the UK
does not exercise the same degree of control over Iraq as existed in
relation to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus."205
Neither of these remarks go as far as denying that the situation in
Iraq does not meet our test, but given that they are made in the context of
a statement which denies the applicability of the ECHR, they require us
to ask whether or not the test is met and, if so, whether this renders the
ECHR-and perhaps the ICCPR also-inapplicable.
It might be thought that, to adopt the words of the European Court of
Human Rights discussing the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, it
is "obvious from the large numbers" of U.K. troops "on active duties" in
the southern part of Iraq, that the U.K. army "exercises effective overall
control over that part" of Iraq or, at least, an area within that part. Ulti-
mately the answer to this question depends on a detailed factual analysis
of the level of control asserted by U.K. forces in Iraq, something which
is beyond the scope of this Article. Even so, however, we must also ask
whether effective control over territory-an understanding of jurisdiction
203. Id. paras. 75-76.
204. Ingram Letter, Apr. 7, 2004, supra note 137.
205. Straw, May 19, 2004, supra note 138.
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based on a spatial relationship---is the only basis on which jurisdiction
can subsist extraterritorially.
4. "Jurisdiction" Conceived Individually
In fact, international human rights law review bodies have also un-
derstood extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of some kind of connection
operating between the State and an individual, rather than whether the
area in which the control is exercised is itself under the State's control.
This connection has been understood variously as control (like the spa-
tial relationship discussed already), power, or authority.
In the aforementioned Coard case, seventeen petitioners complained
to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights about their treat-
ment, including detention, by U.S. forces in the first days of its invasion
of Grenada in 1983.2 6 In its decision, the Commission stated that "juris-
diction:"
... may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an ex-
traterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the
territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state-
usually through the acts of the latter's agents abroad. In princi-
ple, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or
presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether,
under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of
a person subject to its authority and control.207
This definition of "jurisdiction" is potentially wide enough to cover
the exercise of control over individuals, regardless of whether the area
within which such control is exercised is itself under the control of the
State. In the first sentence, the Commission refers to the "person con-
cerned" being "subject to the control" of the State, rather than the
territory in which the person is located. Similarly, in the second sen-
tence, the Commission underlines that "the inquiry turns not on the
presumed victim's ... presence within a particular geographic area,
208
but rather whether or not the "person" is "subject to its [the State's] au-
thority and control." Of course, if a person is located within a territorial
area controlled by the State, then that person would themselves be sub-
ject, indirectly, to the control of the State. The Commission's remarks
are significant because they suggest that "jurisdiction" is not limited to
such a scenario; instead, they offer a more general definition of the con-
206. See Coard, supra note 170 paras. 1-4.
207. Id. para 37.
208. This particular reference to "geographical area" might only be intended to underline




cept-"control" or "authority" exercised over an individual-within
which that particular scenario is situated.
The WM case concerned the acts and omissions of Danish diplo-
matic officers committed within the Danish Embassy in East Berlin in
1988. The European Commission of Human Rights stated:
[A]uthorised agents of a State ... bring other persons or prop-
erty within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent that they
exercise authority over such persons or property. In so far as
they affect such persons or property by their acts or omissions,
the responsibility of the State is engaged.2
The Commission found that the acts took place within the jurisdic-
tion of Denmark, without explaining whether this was because authority
was being exercised over the embassy within which the acts complained
of took place or because authority was being exercised over the appli-
cants via the acts that were being complained of. That said, the
suggestions that "persons" are brought within the jurisdiction of the
State if authority is exercised over them, suggests a personal target for
the relationship of authority.
The previously mentioned Ocalan case concerned Abdullah Ocalan,
the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (the PKK), who was arrested in
Kenya, flown by Turkish agents to Turkey, and detained before being
tried and convicted of activities aimed at bringing about the secession of
a part of state territory and sentenced to death.2'0 The court stated:
* [T]he applicant was arrested by members of the Turkish security
forces inside an aircraft in the international zone of Nairobi Air-
port. Directly after he had been handed over by the Kenyan
officials to the Turkish officials the applicant was under effective
Turkish authority and was therefore brought within the "jurisdic-
tion" of that State ... even though in this instance Turkey
exercised its authority outside its territory. 211
As in the WM case, here the Court fails to state explicitly on what
basis "effective Turkish authority" was being exercised; specifically, we
are not told whether it concerned the relationship between Turkey and
the applicant or Turkey and the location where Turkey held the applicant.
The Court's choice of pertinent facts, however, does perhaps suggest the
former. No reference is made as to whether the aircraft or the
209. M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 193, 196
(1992) (quoting from section entitled The Law, para. 1.).
210. See Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., Admissibility Decision,
§ 1 in The Facts (Dec. 14, 2000).
211. Ocalan (Merits), supra note 4, para 93.
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"international zone" in which it was located were controlled by Turkey,
and the only description given of the acts of Turkish officials concerns
their behavior towards the applicant (e.g. physically forcing him back to
Turkey) rather than their behavior in relation to the space in which the
applicant was held.
In its General Comment 31, on Article 2 of the ICCPR, the UN Hu-
man Rights Committee stated that the jurisdictional test in Article 2.1
"means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.
212
Here, then, we have a clear statement affirming jurisdiction on the
basis of a personal target-"anyone"-and relationship between the
State and this target described in terms of "power or effective control."
Taking these three cases and the General Comment together, we see
that jurisdiction can amount to a relationship of power (General Com-
ment 31), control/effective control (Coard/General Comment 31), or
authority (WM and Ocalan) between the State and the individual, quite
apart from a relationship of control operating with respect to the territory
in which the acts take place. It is difficult to see how U.S. and U.K.
troops in Iraq do not engage in this type of relationship in Iraq.
Section II utilized the taxonomy of spatial and personal targets for
extraterritorial activity as a way of understanding the reason for such
activity. We can see now that this taxonomy is also helpful in under-
standing how such activity is categorized as falling within a State's
"jurisdiction" under the ICCPR and ECHR. Whereas in Section II par-
ticular types of target were emphasized on the basis of the purposes
served by the extraterritorial action (e.g. the personalized target of Al
Qaeda in the military action in Afghanistan at the end of 2001), here
purpose is irrelevant. As far as the application of human rights obliga-
tions is concerned, the question is only whether a factual relationship of
"effective control" over territory-the spatial target--or power, control,
or authority over an individual-the personal target--exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 9/11, there has been an increased recourse to extraterritorial
activities in the field of terrorism and asylum policy. The increased re-
course to such activities has been matched by commentary suggesting
that in some cases these activities take place in a "legal black hole." As
far as the two main international treaties on civil and political rights-
212. HRC General Comment 31, supra note 165, para. 10.
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the ICCPR and the ECHR-are concerned, two States engaging in these
activities, the United States and the United Kingdom, seem to consider,
for differing reasons and to varying extents, that their obligations under
these instruments (under the ICCPR as far as the United States is con-
cerned) do not apply extraterritorially.
With the backdrop of a shift in public discourse on the use of torture
and inhuman and degrading treatment in the context of terrorist interro-
gations, and the allegation that certain measures constituting such
treatment are being used in these interrogations, some observers have
speculated that the very choice of an extraterritorial locus for the activity
has been motivated in part by the view that the activity is taken outside
an arena where the State's human rights obligations are in play, enabling
States to act in a manner that would not be permitted on their own soil.
Despite the "legal black hole" comments, and the suggestions made
in the United States and the United Kingdom, this piece has illustrated
that as far as the ICCPR and ECHR are concerned, the avoidance of such
norms is not possible simply by choosing the extraterritorial locus (nor,
indeed, does the shift to "war" render international human rights law
inapplicable). So when the first group of detainees were transferred to
Guantd.namo Bay, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson, stated that "[a]ll persons detained in this context are entitled
to the protection of international human rights law ... in particular the
relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. ,,2 3
213. Mary Robinson, Statement of High Commissioner for Human Rights on Detention
of Taliban and Al Qaida Prisoners in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba (Jan. 16, 2002), at
http://www.unhchr.ch. Various amicus briefs in the joined Supreme Court cases of Rasul and
Al Odah make this argument. The Human Rights Institute of the International Bar Association
states that:
Under international human rights law, the U.S. is bound by treaty and customary in-
ternational law to grant detainees access to judicial review concerning the
lawfulness of their detention. This obligation arises in Petitioners' case as a result of
the authority and control that the U.S. exercises over Guantdnamo Bay, regardless
of whether the U.S. retains ultimate sovereignty.
Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Institute of the International Bar Association at 7, Rasul
v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004)(Nos. 03-334, 03-343). See also Luigi Condorelli & Pasquale
de Sena, The Relevance of the Obligations Flowing from the UN Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights to US Courts Dealing with Guantdnamo Detainees, 2 J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 107
(2004). On Iraq, the June, 2004 report of the acting UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights stresses the applicability of the "international human rights standards" prohibiting
torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment to the U.S. and the U.K. actions in
Iraq. UNHCHR/Ramcharan, supra note 54, para. 54. Comments by UN officials in relation to
the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison have stressed the importance of compliance with the ICCPR,
implying the applicability of this instrument. See, e.g., Press Release, Lefa Zerrougui, Chair-
person-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, UN Human Rights Expert Calls on Coalition Authorities to
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States taking the range of extraterritorial actions outlined above-
whether setting up camps for asylum seekers outside their territory or
detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects in other States-are bound
by their ECHR and/or ICCPR obligations in their conduct of this activity
insofar as it involves the exercise of either effective control over territory,
or power, control, or authority over an individual or individuals.
Allow Iraqi Detainees to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention, HR/4742, IK/435 (May 5,
2004), at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/hr4742.doc.htm concerning the right of
access to a court to be able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention under Art. 9 of the
ICCPR.
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